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Introduction
Starting with the 17th-century extinction of the Dodo (Raphus cucullatus),
continuing to the disappearance of the passenger pigeon (Ectopistes migratorius) in the
1800’s, Thylacene (Thylacinus cynocephalus) a century later and the loss of the Chinese
River Dolphin (Lipotes vexillifer) only eight years ago, the human race has become
increasingly aware of its capacity to influence the natural world and, unfortunately, its
ability to irreversibly destroy other lineages with which it shares its existence on earth.
The catastrophic loss of species diversity by means of anthropogenic extinction has
become a subject of growing concern for human beings in the last century, and the extent
of its urgency continues to be unveiled.
E.O. Wilson (2002) describes the disastrous effects of human beings on natural
systems, explaining that the arrival of people has resulted in massive extinction events in
every area newly-colonized by the species. It is only today that societies are beginning to
understand the damage our actions have caused to the surrounding environment, and the
statistics are mind-numbing.
The IUCN red list, perhaps the foremost source of information on biodiversity
loss, provides frighteningly concrete evidence of this crisis. Of all known species, 21% of
mammals, 12% of birds, 30% of amphibians are to some degree endangered or at risk of
endangerment or extinction. Of those species evaluated by the IUCN, 28% of reptiles,
37% of freshwater fish 35% of invertebrates and 70% of plants are also at risk. A total of
5

over 11,000 species are currently classified as at risk of extinction (IUCN Red List, 200810). Estimating a rate of extinction of between one- and ten-thousand species per million
for the present and coming decades, Wilson clearly conveys the grim truth that “at least a
fifth of the species of plants and animals [on earth] would be gone or committed to early
extinction by 2030, and half by the end of the century” (Wilson, 2002, pp. 102). Many
contemporary authors also claim that human beings are the cause of the 6th mass
extinction in known evolutionary history, equating anthropogenic effects to the asteroid
impact which wiped out the dinosaurs (Leakey and Lewin, 1996; Sarkar, 2005). Indeed,
as Sahotra Sarkar carefully concluded, the human race has entered a biodiversity crisis of
its own making (Sarkar, 2005).
In the face of this crisis conservation biology, a “science of necessity” was
formed; an odd amalgam of social movement and scientific study dedicated to the
preservation of Earth’s vanishing natural heritage. Indeed, conservation biology
represents the “intersection of science, applied science, and politics” (MacLaurin and
Sterelny, 2004, pp. 5) in the effort to conserve biological diversity. The difficulty with the
discipline of conservation biology is that it “requires an unprecedented mix of biology
and ethics” (Rolston, 2003, pp. 206) which necessitates the cooperation and coordination
of scientists, politicians, philosophers, and the general public alike. The many intellectual
parties involved with biodiversity conservation have resulted in widely disparate and
incongruous action in conservation initiatives, yielding inconsistent support to
endangered biological phenomena.
Thus, in the process of clamoring to preserve the planet’s immense wealth of
biodiversity, human beings have created an unstructured and largely subjective system of
6

ethics, policy, and research by which conservation measures are developed and carried
out. Conservation is managed independently by dozens of governments and thousands of
organizations worldwide in equally numerous ways and by equally numerous ethical and
scientific standards. Consequently, efforts to preserve biological variety are left
disorganized and insufficient, and the biodiversity crisis is poorly addressed.
As James MacLaurin and Kim Sterelny put it, “From the beginning, there has
been potentially troubling ambiguity in thinking about biodiversity in conservation
biology” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2004, pp. 2). The sort of ambiguity created by initial
human ignorance to the nature and value of biodiversity has left the field of conservation
biology unprincipled and without a concrete framework for cooperation. Even now, many
philosophical and ethical issues regarding biodiversity and its conservation have yet to be
addressed. As Bryan Norton admitted, “there remain important differences regarding how
much we should do, what we should do, and even what is of ultimate value” (Norton, pp.
110). Among the various issues on which conservationists differ, three questions surface
which form the root of nearly every biodiversity debate: What is biodiversity? Why
should we preserve it, and what value does it have? And lastly, but perhaps most
importantly: How can we preserve it?
The main objective of this work is to address these questions and attempt to find
universally applicable answers that clarify the goals of conservation biology in order to
encourage consistency and unification of future conservation efforts. In the following
three sections, each of these questions will be confronted with respect to a variety of
stances and opinions from various authors in the fields of biology and environmental
philosophy. Using this multidisciplinary approach, I will provide the precursor to a
7

principled framework by which a global conservation ethic can be unified in both action
and direction. Keeping in mind the numerous academic disciplines involved in the
science of conservation biology, it follows that any attempt to answer major theoretical
problems in the field must include a combination of scientific and philosophical thought.
This bifocal perspective will allow the strengths of each discipline to forge a clear and
structured conceptual framework lacking neither practicality nor logical or ethical
soundness.
The three central questions around which this work is based will be addressed in
logical order. It makes sense that, before tackling issues like the value of diversity or how
to conserve it, one must have a clear concept of what is meant by diversity. Thus, the first
section of this work, “What is Biodiversity?” sets out to conceptualize the somewhat
abstract notion of biodiversity and form a concrete definition by which conservationists
can define what exactly it is that they value and wish to preserve. A review of
biodiversity definitions will accompany a growing and exhaustive list of components
which make up the sort of phenomena which create biological variation, resulting
ultimately in an inclusive list of biodiversity components and the manner in which they
contribute to the variety and future stability of natural systems.
The second section, “Why Conserve Biodiversity?” addresses the myriad ethical
issues surrounding biodiversity conservation, primarily the question of justifying
biodiversity conservation. In this section I outline a set of adequacy conditions by which
a conservation ethic can be assessed for its efficacy and soundness, and proceed to
examine the most prominent conservation ethics practiced today. Within this
examination, I describe the strengths and weaknesses of various common conservation
8

ethics, and propose the use of a practical-pluralist ethic based on the application of these
ethics in contexts where their particular strengths are best applied.
In the final section of “Of Ethics and Ecosystems”, I shall confront the rather
daunting question of how exactly human beings should go about conserving biodiversity.
Given the practical nature of this question, an exhaustive response would be unattainable
for a project of this scale, so I take a more focused approach in the examination of a case
study. By reviewing the successes and failures of the Republic of Costa Rica—one of the
world’s “greenest” countries—I highlight a number of common conservation issues
confronted within the country and the solutions with which they are addressed.
Additionally, I review the implications of the previous two sections—particularly a more
inclusive and multifaceted definition of biodiversity and a practical-pluralist conservation
ethic—for conservation practices today and how they might be successfully implemented
in future actions. The section thus culminates with a list of suggestions and ideas to
improve biodiversity conservation at all levels, be they political, social, cultural, or
scientific.
It is through the conclusions of these three sections that I hope to provide the
basic outline for a larger conservation framework. The conclusions reached throughout
this work are intended not for speculation but for practical application. Thus, it is my
intention that they form the precursor to a global conservation ethic or standard which
may bring greater efficacy and consistency to biodiversity conservation initiatives
worldwide.

9

With these goals in mind, I encourage the reader to explore the observations and
arguments presented in the following pages and reflect on how they might be applied to
the growing number of conservation efforts throughout the world. Thus, in an effort to
provide satisfactory and practical answers to some of the most challenging questions
facing the field of conservation biology, I would like to start from scratch by exploring
the concept of biodiversity itself.

Section I: What is Biodiversity?

I.1 The Subjectivity of Biodiversity
Among the many daunting problems facing the biodiversity conservation movement is a
deceptively simple question which, if left unanswered, dooms the entire field of thought to eternal
speculation. This question, of course, is the first obstacle encountered in the arduous path toward
a reliable and reasonable conservation policy: put bluntly, what is biodiversity? As explained in
MacLaurin and Sterelny's aptly-named What is Biodiversity?, biodiversity conservation is
plagued by a “troubling ambiguity in thinking” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008 pp. 2) which
cripples the practicality of a discipline founded on urgent necessity. Vastly disparate definitions
of biodiversity have been used for myriad purposes in conservation biology, ranging from the
strict “species count” definition to Sahotra Sarkar's liberal “biologically interesting phenomena”
(Sarkar, 2002).
Needless to say, if biologists and philosophers of biology are unable to characterize a
specific target of conservation, it is unlikely that policymakers with more pragmatic demands will
be capable of identifying clear goals for conservation initiatives. A simplistic definition like
10

species count may be immensely useful from a practical point of view, but does not present a
complete picture. On the other hand, an all-inclusive definition leaves no aspect of nature
unprotected, but would be virtually impossible to put into practice. Before a conservation ethic or
policy can be formed, it must be clear what exactly is being valued and why. This section will
focus on the challenge of defining biodiversity, with the particular interest of finding a balance
between practicality and reality to encompass as many valuable aspects of biological systems as
possible.
The concept of biodiversity is undoubtedly an abstract one. As such, it will be somewhat
difficult to define subjectively, but more importantly, nearly impossible to define objectively.
While the issue of actual measurement of biodiversity (and thus the objective, scientific
definition) will be confronted in part III of this text, our current goal is more theoretical. The idea
is to present in clear terms the dimensions and properties of a multifaceted concept and thus
outline a target for conservation efforts. This abstract notion of biodiversity, as mentioned before,
is difficult to represent clearly in words. The UN conference on Environment and Development
(1992) defined biodiversity as
“the variability among living organisms from all sources including... terrestrial, marine,
and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes
diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems.”
A few key issues are immediately apparent in this definition that will be central to the
interests of this section. First, the word “variability”, the keystone of the entire description, which
implies immediately that disparity among biota is crucial to biodiversity. Needless to say, this is
also implied by the “diversity” which makes up most of the concept's name. Thus, any parameters
outlined to make up biodiversity are recognized for the differences between them. Plurality is
evidently an important aspect of a biodiversity definition, as evident in the repeated listing of
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subjects above, including multiple settings in which biodiversity can be found and forms which it
can take. Taking from this definition its most basic elements, one comes to the conclusion that a
definition of biodiversity must recognize differences, and recognize these differences in a variety
of ecological and evolutionary contexts.
What arises from this analysis is a clearer view of the problem to be addressed in this
section, the “units and differences problem” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008) which asks
specifically which aspects of the natural world are important enough to be considered
“Biodiversity” (with a capitol “B”) and how the differences found within those aspects can be
measured. Many would agree that the pluralist approach of policymakers in the UN clause shown
above is certainly a good start; in fact, according to MacLaurin and Sterelny, it is unlikely “that
anyone really thinks there is a single natural property of a biological system that captures all its
biologically relevant diversity” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 7). With this in mind, I begin
this section by rejecting the possibility of a single metric of biodiversity. How, then, will this
problem be approached?

I.2 A Piecemeal Approach
Thinking logically, when one is faced with a concept which cannot be encompassed as a
whole, one must view the sum of its parts. With biodiversity, however, it would be difficult to
quantify the “sum” of all factors contributing to a system's diversity. The best option, then, is to
encompass as much of the concept as possible, a “next-best-thing” approach. MacLaurin and
Sterelny (2008) take a similar approach by characterizing several biodiversity “surrogates”
defined as “readily identifiable and measurable features of biological systems.” These surrogates
serve as biodiversity indices which, given their practical accessibility, are more manageable than
the intangible concept of biodiversity but still give information about its condition.
12

Many of these surrogates, notably species or ecosystem richness, provide at best only
partial representations of the full scale of biological phenomena found in nature. As a result, in
the creation of a working definition of biodiversity, it may be worthwhile to combine various
surrogates and create a sort of “multifaceted” biodiversity concept. In the course of this section, I
will combine the concept of surrogates with the pluralist idea of gathering many separate
biodiversity metrics to form a definition of biodiversity which represents the great majority of
biological phenomena.
By accumulating a sum of “parts” which in one way or another represent biological
variation, one can achieve greater proximity to a hypothetically exact biodiversity concept.
Because one cannot quantify the quality “B”, representing all things humans find valuable and
worthy of conservation in biological systems, it may be easier to approach piecemeal through the
inclusion of a variety of component phenomena. A mathematical analogy serves well to describe
this approach. Anyone familiar with the basics of calculus may recall the idea of Riemann sums;
the premise of which is, when calculating the area under a curve (an otherwise incalculable
value), a mathematician creates a number of measurable, rectangular boxes beneath the curve
which touch it on one corner and thus account for most of the space in a specific area beneath the
curve. Summing the area of several of these rectangles will give a fairly accurate estimation of
the area under the curve. Increasing the number of rectangles, one increases the accuracy of the
estimation. For the purposes of estimating another impossible-to-quantify concept, in this case
biodiversity, it seems wise to take a similar approach, using biodiversity surrogates as our
rectangles, and summing these values to obtain a reliable (though not exact) picture of our goal.
Such a method, however, requires a certain attitude to avoid misuse. It must be clearly understood
that the sum of our surrogate-rectangles is not the actual property B or the area under our
biodiversity curve, but an estimation of that quantity. Thus, in the case of policymaking and
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measurement (section III), studies with this method as a conceptual framework must not treat it as
an absolute, but as a “best-guess”.
In this way, a “workable” definition of biodiversity is acquired without denying that
many more unknown factors may be involved. The value of this intermediate view is not only
that it combines the advantages of two opposing approaches to biodiversity but that it uses a
scientific mindset of acting on what appears to be proven without assuming the possession of an
absolute truth. We have thus accomplished, at least in theory, a framework for defining
biodiversity which matches our initial goals. It retains practical applicability while refraining
from the assumption that all possible aspects of biological diversity are included within its
parameters. Maintaining this trajectory, we may move on to the selection of factors which will
sum to a representation of biodiversity.

I.3 Species Diversity
The most obvious (and according to some, most important) element of biodiversity is the
concept of species richness. Usually measured as a simple “species-count” within the particular
region or ecosystem in question, species richness is considered the most quantifiable and concrete
component of biodiversity. This makes sense from a broad perspective; when one thinks of
differences between organisms, taxonomic differences are usually the first to come to mind. It is
without question, then, that great value is placed on species as an element of biodiversity. In fact,
the importance of taxonomic diversity was recognized before the broader concept of biodiversity,
easily apparent in the early legislation of the Endangered Species Act. The goal of the act, of
course, was to preserve species diversity by protecting endangered species from extinction. If not
only hundreds of conservation organizations but also the United States government are promoting
the preservation of species diversity, it seems indisputable that species are an essential component
14

of biodiversity. In fact, the first thing to come to mind at the mention of biodiversity is a speciescount; many ecologists use species richness as a dependable measure of biodiversity and
ecosystem health (Vane-wright et al, 1991). The apparent concreteness of species richness makes
it a seductive candidate as a biodiversity surrogate, but does his quantifiability hold true under
closer scrutiny? More specifically, are species a “natural kind”? Do they provide an absolute
measure of one type of diversity?
MacLaurin and Sterelny's What is Biodiversity? provides an exceptional analysis of the
concept of species in its second chapter, appropriately titled “Species: a Modest Proposal”. The
chapter begins by presenting a few “chinks in the armor” in the customary biological species
definition, which defines species as genetically isolated populations which are incapable of
interbreeding. The authors cite a number of exceptions and potential problems for this definition,
including the presence of “intermediate” populations; genetically distinct groups that can
interbreed and produce viable offspring. Such organisms exhibit a form of valuable diversity in
their genetics and would by one definition be called separate species, but because they can
produce fertile offspring, would not warrant such distinction by the widely recognized biological
species concept. How should such factors be analyzed from a conservation point of view? Which
definition would—or even should—be used? This example plants seeds of skepticism in our
former faith in species as viewed through a biological lens.
MacLaurin and Sterelny, however, are interested in an even broader investigation of
species. After all, given the previous line of thinking, does it not follow that there are different
definitions of species? The authors present a vast abundance of definitions and perspectives on
species, and ask reasonably “are there reasonable prospects... of a consensus view of the nature of
species?” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 29) Needless to say, if this were not the case,
previous assumptions about the utility of species richness in biodiversity measurement would be
questionable; biodiversity conservation would be without its most trusted surrogate. The nearly15

ubiquitous utility of the species concept in the biological sciences warrants an effort to justify its
application to conservation issues.
MacLaurin and Sterelny continue systematically, listing common species definitions from
diverse standpoints. The list includes at least seven distinct perspectives, including typological,
phenetic, biological, ecological, cohesion, evolutionary, and cladistic species. A specific flaw or
gap is found in each, and a few of these will be reviewed briefly below.
Typological species, or species determined by a fixed set of characteristics, are likely the
most pedestrian of species definitions. These species are identifiable by certain individual
characteristics and are “locked”, so to speak, within that identity by those characteristics. This
conceptualization makes the assertion that individual species have an “essence” which determines
what they are (and are not). Thus, according to the typological species concept, species
themselves are a “natural kind” which is readily identifiable and distinguishable. According to
MacLaurin and Sterelny, because typological species are bound by these strict sets of criteria,
they fail to account for a fundamental tenet of modern biology: that species change over time. In
other words, typological species, by definition, imply that species do not change over time
(MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008), a view which conflicts with the theory of evolution and likely
the reality of most conservation situations. The reality of this criticism is obvious; in attempting
to preserve a particular species, are human beings willing to prevent the creation of another by
interrupting the evolutionary process?
Ecological species, defined by their niches or “roles” within a particular ecosystem, are
explained to be unrealistic because a species can perform a variety of functions depending on the
ecosystem in which they live. In the words of the authors, “species do not have niches. Instead,
they are ensembles of populations, each with its own niche” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008 pp.
38). This criticism seems valid; it is not difficult to imagine that an omnivorous rodent might
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function as a primary consumer in one ecosystem and an insect-predator in another. The
argument against ecological species is that a species' relationship with its environment (in its
geology and climate) is far too complex to be glossed over by something as simple as a unique
niche for each species.
MacLaurin and Sterelny continue reviewing and rebutting various definitions of species,
outlining specific (and often shared) weaknesses in these conceptualizations, before presenting an
approach which they claim avoids such shortcomings. The idea is outwardly much simpler than
those previously discussed, though its derivation is somewhat complicated. The classification that
the authors present is the idea of “phenomenological species”, defined as “recognizable,
reidentifiable clusters of organisms” or more implicitly as those “which make field guides
possible” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008 pp 40). From this standpoint, phenomenological species
are a general and inclusive definition based more on appearances than on any form of genetic or
phylogenetic isolation. The idea stems from the fact that the environmental effects on isolated
populations (smaller parts of a larger “metapopulation” now isolated from the whole) can impose
different selective pressures on these populations, eventually giving rise to a new species. In this
way, the largely abiotic factors of the surrounding environment can release what the authors call
the “evolutionary brake” on evolutionary change which metapopulation dynamics (interbreeding)
impose on the genesis of genetically distinct groups. The surface-changes of populations
separated in this way are simple phenotype change, and as the authors state, “Speciation is not
required for phenotype change... but it is often required to make such changes permanent”
(MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008 pp. 39). The authors instead focus on the process by which
populations of changing phenotypes become isolated by geologic factors and are lead to undergo
speciation. Phenomenological species are thus those brought about by this general process,
referred to as a “life cycle” of a species. By this definition, any subpopulation that bears certain
recognizable differences and is to a significant extent reproductively isolated from nearby
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populations is considered a distinct species. In this way, even subpopulations which show some
distinct “promise” of becoming separate species are recognized as well as well-established
species.
MacLaurin and Sterelny explain that “phenomenological species richness captures a
crucial dimension of biodiversity” and that “the phenomenological species richness of a region is,
in an important sense, a catalogue both of phenotypic variety and of the potential evolutionary
resources available in that region.”(MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008 pp. 40). The idea of
phenomenological species is, not unlike my approach to biodiversity, considered a “best bet”
option and not an absolute solution. For instance, it is mentioned that these species “do not
represent equal amounts of evolutionary information and evolutionary potential” (MacLaurin and
Sterelny, 2008 pp. 40) between different lineages. Thus, under the inclusive definition of
phenomenological species, different recognized species represent different levels of genetic
divergence and thus are not all created “equal”. The strength of phenomenological species, by
contrast, is that they embrace the process of evolution by including any independently-evolving
lineage rather than only those isolated by more specific factors like genetic isolation or ecological
function. This species definition also allows for greater flexibility in the classification of microbes
and other asexual organisms, to which the concept of interbreeding does not readily apply. In
such cases, the OTU’s (Operational Taxonomic Units) used to classify many microbes based on
genetic differences act identically to a phenomenological species definition, providing the same
opportunity for practical application.
Is species richness, then, a shoe-in to any list of surrogates for biodiversity? Bryan Norton
argues that this is not necessarily the case. Admitting that species are easy to identify and have a
basis in biological facts, Norton calls the concept of species classification and conservation
“atomistic” and argues that they make an inherent assumption that natural phenomena are largely
static (Norton, 2003). There is validity to his point; one of the principle tenets of modern biology
18

is the plasticity of species and their ability to form from genetic differences among individuals
and individual populations. Thus, to improve the accuracy of our definition of biodiversity,
potential sources of new species (fitting the working definition of phenomenological species)
must also be considered. Returning to the analogy of Riemann sums, these potential sources act
as additional “rectangles” along the curve of an abstract concept of biodiversity.

I.4 Morphological Diversity
The first of these to come to mind is what is known as disparity. Disparity is roughly
defined as the morphological or phenotypic variation between individual organisms in a
population or community. While species are viewed as “objective units in nature” or “the atoms
of diversity” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 42) morphology makes up a larger-scale
difference not completely encompassed by most definitions of species. Where species often
reflect distinct and recognizable genetic variation involving isolation and separation, disparity
describes variability in expression of a particular set of genes and smaller scales of variation
among individuals of a population. In other words, it is the outward expression of genetic
variability, but not requiring division into isolated populations. This sort of disparity occurs as a
result of different gene expressions of individuals within a population, as well as more minute,
individual- or pedigree-based genetic differences. Morphological disparity is measured thus by
the number of distinct phenotypes (for example fur color, antennae length, leaf shape) in a
population of the same species.
For example, a population of goldfish in a pond with both black-spotted and pure-gold
fish consists of only one species. However, if certain selective pressures abounded, say, predation
by a visual predator, brighter orange fish might be eaten more readily than speckled or darker fish
with better camouflage. Eventually, the population would lose its brighter fish, and even inactive
19

genes for gold or bright phenotypes carried by speckled or darker adults would eventually be
selected out of the population. This would soon result in a new phenomenological species. It is
not difficult to stretch this example to other organisms. Thus, disparity between individuals in a
population is a valuable addition to a definition of biodiversity because it can lead to speciation. It
thus acts as a “key ingredient” in the evolutionary process, the underlying process responsible for
biological variation. As an additional source of speciation and thus biological variation, it forms a
crucial addition to a growing definition of biodiversity.
While—unlike species richness—morphological disparity seems very hard to measure, it
is still considered a relevant and valuable part of biodiversity. Reliable methodology for the
measurement of morphological disparity are discussed thoroughly by MacLaurin and Sterelny but
will be reviewed in part III of this work.

I.5 Developmental Diversity
Adhering to a causal investigation of sources of biological variation, it makes sense not
only to investigate sources of species diversity like morphological disparity, but also the sources
of those sources. Differences in organism development—among species or individuals of a single
population—are the principle sources of phenotypic disparity. It follows that if certain genetic or
environmental differences in an organism affect its development, phenotypic disparity of
individuals will occur within populations. It thus seems conceivable, at least with respect to the
pluralist and inclusive definition formation under way, that developmental differences may also
be an important source of biological variation, be they caused by genetic or environmental
differences. Nonetheless, a closer look at the relevance and importance of this concept is
necessary to warrant its inclusion.
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In Chapter 5 of their work, “What is Biodiversity?” MacLaurin and Sterelny focus on
development and its contribution to the concept of biodiversity. Development is viewed as an
additional factor in morphological disparity, the utility of which lies in “supplementing a
phylogenetically informed species richness measure of biodiversity with a tractable and
principled concept of morphological diversity” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 85).
Development serves this general purpose as a way of creating a “tractable and principled”
concept of disparity. “The developmental system of lineage”, say MacLaurin and Sterelny,
“determines those aspects of phenotype that can vary independently...” (MacLaurin and Sterelny,
2008, pp. 85) and thus is a key factor in determining disparity or even assessing its potential to
arise. As discussed earlier, developmental differences play a distinct role in determining
phenotypic variation. Furthermore, organism development is often used in distinguishing the
taxonomic relatedness of species. The question remains, however, how exactly this quality of
variation can be observed.
MacLaurin and Sterelny introduce the concept of “evolutionary plasticity” as a tool to
conceptualize developmental differences. Evolutionary plasticity is the ability of a species or
lineage of organisms to have phenotypic variety; the type which may lead either to greater
resilience of the population to environmental changes or eventual divergence and speciation—
both properties of great relevance to biodiversity. This concept is the framework by which
developmental differences are added to the growing definition of biodiversity. Plasticity is an
“elemental resource”, a value of an organism or species which predicts its ability to have greater
variety in its population and thus change and adapt to a changing environment. Taking a broad
perspective, it is not hard to imagine that phenotypic disparity increases the ability of a population
or species to change and adapt, as species richness may for an ecosystem. Likewise,
developmental diversity makes morphological differences more frequent and thus promotes the
same benefits of diversity up the causal chain.
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In order for a population to have plasticity, at least three things are needed according to
MacLaurin and Sterelny. First, variety must be added to the population through “genetic
novelties” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 88). These can come in the form of a population
structure which features crossbreeding, mutations, or any other source of genetic variation. Next,
there must be some factor by which the variation can be accumulated. The authors explain how
moderate environments with few selective pressures can “store” plasticity, “preserving genetic
variation that would otherwise be eliminated from the gene pool” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008,
pp. 90). In this way, genes which are not expressed due to lack of necessity add to variation and
plasticity by not affecting the phenotype of an individual in a negative way, while those which are
expressed but are also harmless in the context of the current environment provide the same
contribution to diversity. The last important point is the use of these genetic variations in the
developmental processes of an organism, thereby tying variation to how the organism will grow
and mature. At this point, differences in organism development are the results of genetic
differences, and a new conceptual bridge can be drawn.
The key connection sprouting from developmental biology is that “lineages are
evolutionarily plastic because organisms are developmentally plastic” (MacLaurin and Sterelny,
2008, pp. 91). In other words, the variation in development of organisms can lead to
morphological variety and even eventually speciation. At this point, MacLaurin and Sterelny hit
the core of their argument. Organisms, seen as “developmental mosaics”, have parts and aspects
which develop independently of one another. This, using the aforementioned point of linking
evolutionary with developmental plasticity, means that individual aspects or body parts of a
lineage of organisms can evolve, and hence that greater developmental variation leads to better
“evolvability”. In other words, phenotypic differences in organisms—likely due to developmental
differences—are subject to change, thus providing a mechanism for speciation.
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This concept is no doubt strikingly important for any definition of biodiversity, because it
outlines clearly the role of both disparity and developmental diversity in both the changing state
of species and the possibility of creating new ones. It will also later be seen that developmental
biology provides the principles for selecting dimensions to examine in investigations attempting
to measure disparity and thus makes the process far simpler and more effective.

I.6 Behavioral Diversity
Moving further and further from the traditional surrogate of species richness, I am
motivated to stretch for sources of variation even further removed. One source rarely considered
is the possibility of behavioral differences among individuals or subpopulations within a species.
Not unlike other surrogates added to this patchwork definition of biodiversity, behavioral
variation can influence developmental and morphological disparity between organisms,
conceivably playing a role in the eventual divergence of new species. Thus, behavioral
differences—specifically those which are independent of genetic factors—present a unique and
powerful influence over the evolutionary process. In fact, this idea is a major point in the study of
animal behavior, in which the adaptive effects of organism behaviors are studied.
Before behavioral variation can be considered as a separate and therefore necessary
component to the definition of biodiversity being formed, it must be understood to be distinct
from the genetic diversity accounted for by other components like species and developmental
differences. Though indeed many behaviors are known to be genetically determined, those which
are important for conservation are those not included in and dependent upon an organism’s
genome, but instead those which are independent and therefore perpetuated only by learning and
cultural transmission, constituting a form of biological information separate from genetic
diversity.
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It is not unthinkable that learned behaviors or tendencies might eventually affect genetic
aspects of a population including development and physiology, perhaps leading to divergence
given sufficient time; as a hypothetical example, consider a species of cat which develops a
penchant for following a pack of canids and scavenging the remains of their kill. The cat's body
would develop differently within its lifetime, accounting for a switch from solitary hunting to
scavenging for food. It might have a leaner build and lower metabolism for greater resistance to
starvation, while the lifestyles of its conspecifics necessitate bursts of movement and power for
attacking and killing prey. If remarkably successful, this cat might pass on these behaviors to its
offspring through cultural transmission, resulting in a subpopulation with behaviors entirely
different from those of the rest of the species. Developmental and physiological characteristics
would arise as selected by the demands of this new lifestyle. This subpopulation, due to changes
in physiology and development brought on by this new behavior or by the advent of some
geographic barrier from other populations, might eventually form a new phenomenological
species.
Indeed, evidence of this process has surfaced throughout the field of animal behavior.
Recent research on a number of taxa illustrates the concrete link between behavior and lifestyle,
tacking behavior as another way in which organisms adapt to their surroundings and thus
introduce further biological variation. One recent example is a study on Japanese macaques
(Macaca fuscata), in which frequency of thermoregulative behaviors (like huddling and
sunbathing) were observed to change with seasonal temperature fluctuations (Hanya et al, 2007).
Even more convincing are the various subpopulations of killer whales whose divergent
behavior has some taxonomists wondering if they should be called separate species. Various
killer whale populations have been observed which display vastly disparate behaviors for feeding
on equally divergent prey: great whales, seals and smaller sea mammals, and large fish (Schrope,
2007). Orcas have also been observed hunting in behaviorally complex ways, “drowning” sharks
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at the water's surface and washing seals from icebergs with waves generated by their flukes
(Schrope, 2007). At least two distinct subpopulations, like those hypothetically discussed in the
earlier example of the wild cat, have been established for Orcas, including one which feeds
almost exclusively on mammals, and another which feeds almost exclusively on fish. Though it is
still debated whether these populations represent isolated “sibling species” (distinct species which
only appear similar) or simply subpopulations, the vast differences in their behavior provide a
telling example. Interestingly enough, behavioral differences as large as the use (or non-use) of
echolocation are observed between these populations. While both subpopulations have the ability
to echolocate, those which hunt mammals do not echolocate or communicate verbally while
hunting to avoid alerting their prey, which have the ability to hear echolocation vocalizations.
Meanwhile, orcas who hunt fish which are deaf to their echolocation find and track their prey
using echolocation (Barrett-Lenard et al, 1996). In this way, though physiologies are nearly the
same (the mammal-eating “transient” whales have not lost their ability to echolocate), behaviors
account for a huge difference in role and impact on the environment and thus account for
substantial variation.
An even more extreme case of the biological variation arising from behavior is found in
tool use. Specific subpopulations of both chimpanzees and dolphins have been observed using
tools for foraging and problem solving in the wild. Chimpanzees have been observed using sticks
to extract ants and termites from the mounds, while a population of bottlenose dolphins near
Shark Bay, Australia are often seen using sponges to protect their rostrums from sea urchins
during benthic foraging (Jackson, 1942; Smolker et al, 1997). Furthermore, this tool-use appears
to be a tradition in these subpopulations, meaning that it is not conveyed genetically but passed
down through imitation from adult to offspring (Krützen et al, 2005; Sugiyama, 1997). With this
in mind, it is clearer that preservation of genetic components of biological diversity already
included in our definition would not preserve these unique behaviors; they exist only within the
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community of organisms whose culture preserves them through cultural transmission. On an
intuitive basis, one can imagine how the complex cognitive abilities of human beings may have
developed the same way, eventually leading to a genetic change.
It is also worth mentioning that behavioral diversity represents a unique form of
biological information in and of itself. While the potential to change genetic information in the
form of changing selective pressures on an organism is indeed important, it should be noted that
the value of unique, non-genetic behaviors stretches beyond this potential. The fact that
behavioral diversity is a form of information independent from the physical, organic aspect of
evolution makes it all the more valuable, leading to adaptively-important change in a community
of organisms that is completely independent of their genetic makeup. Thus, though a population
of chimpanzees adept at using tools has certainly not yet become a unique species, the behavioral
adaptation shared in its culture constitutes a large part of its adaptation for survival. Would it pay
to exclude such a step in the evolutionary process from a definition of biodiversity?
Despite the convincing case made by numerous examples of behavior, a few key factors
and criticisms with regard to behavioral variation must be taken into account before it can
dependably be included in a definition of biodiversity. First, to avoid redundancy, behavioral
differences must, like the cultural traditions among Shark Bay dolphins and various
subpopulations of chimpanzees, be independent of genetic factors already being accounted for.
Naturally, bioreductivist thinkers may deny the inclusion of behavioral diversity in biodiversity
by attributing it solely to genetic and developmental differences, the likes of which were already
included in earlier portions of the growing definition. This may indeed be the case with some
organisms, in which behavioral differences can be accounted for by genetic differences, but not
for species such as chimpanzees, dolphins, and killer whales which exhibit learned behavior and
trends of cultural transmission. With this in mind, it should be added that only certain types of
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behavioral diversity should be included in an inclusive biodiversity definition to avoid
redundancy.
Second, they must be readily transmittable between individuals. Needless to say, if only a
single organism has the ability to perform a certain behavior, no matter what the importance or
effect of this action, it will die with the organism. Thus, in order for a behavior to be a
evolutionarily valuable source of biological variation, it must be an ongoing source of variation,
and must be transferred from parent to offspring or more widely among organisms in a
population. Adding the above stipulation of separating behaviors from genetic differences, such a
behavior must be taught to the offspring or learned through passive observation. This requirement
may exclude certain organisms, notably particularly asocial ones or those which do not interact
(through rearing or other social means) with their offspring. Additionally, any organisms which
cannot “learn” (arguably many plant and fungal species) or have low cognitive complexity may
also be excluded. Thus, behavioral diversity only acts as a source of variation in certain select
species.
At this point in the ongoing pursuit of an inclusive and accurate approximation for
biodiversity, it is evident that the “source of a source” method of deriving additional sources of
biological variation is exhausted. Recognizing the evolutionary links between various
components of natural variety—for example, that disparity can lead to speciation, and that
behavioral changes can lead to developmental changes—I have been able to “derive” new
candidates for addition to the growing biodiversity concept formed in this section. However,
further derivation seems problematic. There is no readily-discernible “agent” by which new
behaviors come to exist, unlike the way that changes in development can gradually lead to
changes in phenotype, and so on. Thus, for the reminder of the section, I will focus on another
component of biodiversity at a different “end” of this causal chain.
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I.7 The Case for Ecological Diversity
Returning to where it all started, the study of species richness (and diversity), I revisit the
criticisms of this surrogate posed by Bryan Norton. In his 2003 work, “Searching for
Sustainability: Interdisciplinary Essays in the Philosophy of Conservation Biology” Norton
addresses what he calls the “scale problem” in conservation biology. The problem lies in the fact
that, according to Norton, the attention of conservation biology has been too narrow. He explains
that a gradual broadening of our lens of conservation (from individual organism to species, from
species to taxa, from taxa to ecosystems) is the correct course of action, and that at present we are
emerging from the second of three phases which he calls the biodiversity phase (Norton, 2003).
According to Norton, “the biodiversity phase represented a distinct advance in
conceptualization because of the introduction of multiple layers of diversity and the emphasis on
varied dynamics and habitats as well as species” (Norton, 2003, pp. 114). The biodiversity phase
is explained to be the prominence of thinking not unlike that which this work is founded upon;
that there are multiple factors in nature which necessitate preservation, beyond a simple species
count. Additionally, it is a certain focus on processes in nature, not just static elements (Norton,
2003). The problem with this method, however, is that it focuses perhaps too much on processes
and not enough on the elements currently present.
Norton argues that though this perspective is a good one, it still presents a narrow scope
which must be widened further to what he calls the “sustainability of ecosystem health” program
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supposedly in use today and destined for use in the future. By this perspective, the efforts by
conservationists up to the current decade have been too narrowly focused on “small” scale
conservation. Norton's perspective “argues that policies to protect biological diversity must
monitor and protect larger ecological units, such as ecological systems” (Norton, 2003, pp. 115).
This perspective stems from the observed correlation between ecosystem health and species
abundance, thus implying “that saving species may eventually play a less-central role in
biodiversity policy” (Norton, 2003, pp. 121). Norton’s argument is essentially a holistic one,
implying that the health of an ecosystem can provide us with the “whole picture” which
represents all (or most) other components of biodiversity and thus bypasses the growing pluralist
definition being assembled in this work. Needless to say, this is a desirable end, as each
additional component of biodiversity necessitates further measurement and evaluation for
application in the policy-making world. A simpler definition would make life quite a bit easier.
Such practical matters of measurement and application will be discussed in greater depth in the
third section of this work.
My disagreement with Norton's view is minor, and mainly nominal in nature. Put simply,
it is my argument that what Norton presents in his work, rather than a new approach to
biodiversity, is a strong case for the inclusion of ecosystems and their “health” in the patchwork,
frankensteinian approximation of biodiversity being formed in this work. Unless only in name, I
argue that conservation biology has not escaped the “biodiversity phase”, but may be simply
expanding and adding to the definition of that ideal it works to preserve. Of course, in both
acknowledging the importance of ecosystem health and management of ecosystems and denying
the fact that they are an all-inclusive representation of biodiversity; I am taking an intermediate
stand on the holist view of the environment. Specifically put, it is my opinion that holist
arguments regarding biological phenomena are commonly correct but not entirely sufficient; thus
ecosystems and ecosystem health are a valuable component of biodiversity, but cannot account

29

for it as a whole. A noteworthy examination of the role of ecosystems in biodiversity is given in
MacLaurin and Sterelny's What is Biodiversity? which, up until the recent discussion of
behavioral variation, has closely matched the growing biodiversity definition established in this
work.
MacLaurin and Sterelny (2008) gauge the potential of ecosystems and the communities
which inhabit them as surrogates for biodiversity. Their idea is to investigate the possibility that
communities present an additional dimension of biodiversity that should be taken into account in
conservation. Like in other chapters, a question has been confronted by the authors, and they set
out with the apparent intent to provide a working answer to it. However, unlike previous chapters,
they seem to be getting tired of this process, and fail to really prove or disprove the idea presented
above. Instead, they provide a “framework for investigation” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp.
130) which, though frustratingly ambiguous, sets the stage for the explorative purposes of this
work, and will be used as a “launching pad” for the pursuit of a more decisive conclusion.
Their analysis is framed around three main problems which must be overcome to include
ecosystems as a distinct source of biological variation. The first of these will be called the
“coherence” problem, and questions the very existence of biological communities. The second,
named in this work the “holism” problem investigates the possibility of communities having any
distinct properties not included in the sum of their parts (and thus in the components of
biodiversity already included). Lastly, the “boundaries problem” poses a logical objection to the
idea of ecosystems and communities. The boundaries problem argues that because distinct lines
cannot be drawn where one ecosystem ends and another begins, that ecosystems may not
existence as objective units. If they do not exist thus, is it possible to consider them independent
sources of biological diversity like individual organisms? Needless to say, if ecosystems don’t
exist in the same way, diversity between ecosystems cannot be attributed to the ecosystems
themselves and they may not be properly recognized as sources of biological variation.
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In defining communities, the authors are quick to present a dichotomy that draws into
limbo all efforts to include ecosystems and communities in conservation. This divide is over the
nature of biological communities and forms the basis for the “coherence” problem. According to
the authors, there are two possibilities explaining the nature of biological communities as seen in
nature. These are outlined as follows: the first is the “assemblage of indifference”; the
“individualist” point of view, which states that species do not affect one another but instead form
phenomenological communities simply because of abiotic factors like climate conditions. By this
view, what are viewed as “communities” are simply overlapping zones of species distribution due
to common aspects of their respective tolerances for abiotic conditions. The opposing view, and
the one most in line with an ecosystem-health or holist point of view, is that communities are
“organized local systems” which are regulated internally by species interactions. Each species
affects the other within the ecosystem and thus the aspect to be valued is the cohesive whole and
not simply the patchwork of species which seem to be overlapping. This idea of a community is
explicit about the uniqueness and importance of communities due to the biotic interactions
occurring within them, and that an ecosystem has value and characteristics of diversity
independent of the biodiversity within it.
MacLaurin and Sterelny present a number of justifications supporting both hypotheses,
and seem ambivalent throughout the chapter whether ecosystems hold independent value as
sources of biological variation or if they are simply phenomena illustrated by the summation of
their parts. Frequently, they seem to be convinced that the “organized local systems” explanation
is true, with statements like “we can infer from the qualitative stability of communities that they
are networks of biological interaction…” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 118) and
“organisms do not just eat, breed, and die. They reorganize [and subsequently effect] their
environment” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 116). Despite this, they insist that we “cannot
assume that persisting communities are internally regulated.” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp.
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118) and fail once more to make a stand on the subject. The authors provide some brief objections
to the more holist argument on the grounds that there is little observational evidence of the
competitive exclusion principle, and that in some cases competition is hardly observed at all.
MacLaurin and Sterelny later address a second potential problem with the uniqueness of
communities as a component of biodiversity, the existence of characteristics of the community
separate from (but not independent of) the individuals which make up the community. Emergent
properties are essentially properties of an ecosystem that are the result of the ecosystem itself and
not the total actions of its members. It is the biological acknowledgment of the idea that “the
whole is greater than the sum of its parts”. The existence of such properties is closely tied to the
nature of communities as “organized local systems” rather than as “assemblages of indifference”,
and would certainly suggest that communities do exist as more than simple overlaps of
distribution. A number of examples of emergent properties are provided, including ecosystem
stability (due to varied tolerance and functional redundancy) and ecosystem services, noting that
“There is a near-consensus in ecology that, in some measure, there is a positive relationship
between diversity and stability” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp.122). However, once more,
MacLaurin and Sterelny refrain from decisiveness and explain that “to establish an emergent
property of hypothesis, the covariation between the emergent property and its apparent effect
must be robust” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 123). Apparently, the observations of
ecosystem services and increased ecosystem stability found as a general trend in the field of
ecology are insufficiently robust to prove the existence of these emergent properties. Their
hesitation lies in the idea that empirical evidence may theoretically be difficult to obtain for some
systems given that productivity rates must be assessed for individuals in field data collection, and
that ecosystem success and stability may not directly reflect individual success. Thus, MacLaurin
and Sterelny argue, there is insufficient empirical data to prove that ecosystems involve more
than the summation of the organisms within them.
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Another factor relevant to the dichotomy which plagues the use of ecosystems in
conservation is the concept of “boundaries”. If communities were “organized local systems” they
must feature distinct boundaries where one organized local system ends and another begins. The
individualist theory would not necessitate such organization and delineation. They introduce a
hypothesis by Richard Lewins and Richard Lewontin which says that strong versus weak
interactions between organisms can be determined through comparison, and that boundaries
should be formed by the presence or absence of stronger interactions. With such a system, it is
claimed that communities will be “roughly spatially identifiable” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008,
pp. 126). MacLaurin and Sterelny explain that such a view “presuppose[s] that patterns of
interaction are clumped,” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 126) and that organisms within
those communities interact more strongly with one another than other organisms outside their
clump. The authors seem unclear as to whether this form of boundary is realistic and observable.
They reference a potential mechanism for the formation of bounded “patches” of habitats based
on examples in which organisms modify their environments and create potential niches for
themselves and other organisms, but make no definitive assertion to support or refute the
existence of ecosystems and community boundaries (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008).
By the end of their discussion, MacLaurin and Sterelny have made no claim regarding the
existence of ecosystems and communities and their importance (or lack thereof) as components of
biodiversity. Instead, they present three clear obstacles which any conceptualization of
ecosystems must overcome before they can be considered a source of biological variation
independent of the myriad factors which compose them. Before engaging further investigation of
the nature of ecosystems, these obstacles must be challenged. To confront both the “coherence”
problem and “emergent properties” problem, I would like to examine a few examples of biogenic
ecosystems.
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While it can be argued that all ecosystems are in some form biogenic (and though this
claim would support my argument even more strongly, it shall not be made here), certain specific
examples of biogenic ecosystems—those that are formed by the actions and modifications of
specific organisms, and thus cannot exist without them—are powerful enough to challenge the
aforementioned objections regarding the more widely-held understanding of the nature of
ecosystems. Biogenic ecosystems, by definition, prove a level of coherence in an ecosystem by
showing the importance of interactions between certain organisms. All biogenic ecosystems by
necessity depend on the relationships between several distinct forms of life in order to exist in the
first place. Needless to say, if coral polyps were absent from a reef system, the reef system and
the thousands of species and millions of organisms associated with it would cease to exist.
Ignoring for now the widespread effects on other ecosystems associated with the absence of reef
systems, at the very least all biological phenomena contained within the reef are either absent or
severely degraded if the reef itself is absent. Thus, a coral reef cannot be a “community of
indifference”, because the algal symbionts, peppermint shrimp, sea anemones, various fish larvae,
and countless other species which can survive only in the environmental context of a coral reef
can live only in a coral reef; their overlap is not simply due environmental tolerances, but a salient
necessity for their mutual existence.
One would be hard-pressed to argue that such biogenic ecosystems are communities of
indifference. However, MacLaurin and Sterelny argue that because there is little to no evidence
for such intense interdependence in other ecosystems, it is doubtful that communities and
ecosystems (as distinct units of complex interdependence and interaction) exist. The first flaw in
the coherence problem is thus that it assumes that because of certain apparent exceptions,
communities cannot exist anywhere. Though I will not deny that certain exceptions may exist, I
will assert that communities and ecosystems are certainly real biological phenomena, though their
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tangibility may vary substantially. I refer here to a principle of ecology neglected by MacLaurin
and Sterelny's analysis, the intermediate disturbance hypothesis.
This hypothesis states that as environmental stresses intensify, competitive interactions
decrease, and vice-versa (Connell 1975, 1978). Using this hypothesis as a framework, we can
understand why certain ecosystems appear to be more closely-knit communities than others,
especially if (as implied by MacLaurin and Sterelny) competitive interaction is the main criterion
used for identification. In habitats with extreme conditions (extremely high or low temperature,
salinity, precipitation, etc.) competitive interactions lose much of their importance because few
organism populations can ever reach a high enough density to compete with one another or other
species. Thus, in such physically stressful environments, the coherence of a community is
decreased. It is not impossible, then, that under an extreme (let us say at the North or South Pole,
or in geyser vents) conditions, communities of indifference may exist, but between these and
coral reefs are a multitude of “shades of gray” in which the realism and appearance of
communities increases steadily. It may be, then, that the strength and coherence of communities,
as well as their inclusion as a distinct aspect of biodiversity, changes with nature of the ecosystem
itself. Deserts and other high-stress ecosystems with poor species interaction may have most of
their biodiversity “invested” solely in species and other sources of variation, while a coral reef as
a whole has a more distinct component of variation invested simply in the larger web of
interactions it represents. This is not to say that some ecosystems hold no importance as
ecosystems in and of themselves; it must also be noted that MacLaurin and Sterelny neglect to
mention certain inevitable interactions between organisms, including symbiotic relationships and
predator-prey interactions, which are present in all systems and thus at least show some evidence
of emergent properties amongst ecosystems.
If it is clear at least that ecosystems do exist, though along a gradient of prominence, it
must also be established that these ecosystems have certain salient properties beyond the sum of
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their “parts”. My opposition to this “problem” lies in essentially the same discussion as for
biogenic ecosystems. A coral reef is more than the sum of its species, because none of these
individual parts could survive independently from one another. In order for these parts to be
considered distinct from one another, they should have some considerable degree of
independence, but this is not the case. If corals are missing, none of their legions of dependent
species can survive. If coral grazers and resident filter-feeders are absent, corals will die due to
slow growth, excess of dead tissue, and sedimentation which kills the symbiotic algae from which
they draw a large portion of their energy.
Beyond that, as mentioned briefly earlier, there exist certain clear effects (I will not
stretch to call these “benefits”, though the arguments supporting this are strong) of a reef's
presence which impact other non-adjacent systems. For example, coral reefs break waves and
often protect coves by substantially reducing wave-stress in which many species (and
ecosystems) intolerable of such stresses could not otherwise survive. The existence of the coral
reef, then, independent of the abundant life within it, has other effects on the world which would
not be present if the ecosystem as a whole were was not present. Furthermore, certain migratory
fish species have young which can only survive in the shelter of a reef. Without this shelter, the
fish would not grow to adulthood and have certain interactions in other ecosystems (at times
across the ocean) and therefore exert additional effects independent of the presence of the species
contained in the reef. If one is unwilling to accept these more literal emergent properties, there are
also more conceptual forms which might be easier for nonscientists to understand.
In ascribing conceptual emergent properties to ecosystems, I will touch briefly on the
field of biodiversity conservation, a subject to be explained in greater depth in part III of this
work. In attempting to preserve a species, if the species is the only thing valued, an area from
which that endangered species has been extirpated is not a target for conservation. Because the
species is not present there, and only non-endangered species inhabit the area, it is of no concern
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to conservation biologists. However, there is an important connection between this area and the
endangered species which is being valued (what type of value, or how much exactly that is will
be an issue discussed in section II of this work). The area is still a habitat for this endangered
species, a collective set of conditions each of which is necessary to form a zone where the
endangered species can live. Thus, the area is attributed value for its potential to hold this
endangered species. From a practical standpoint, this is almost an intuitive idea, but it presents
certain underlying implications valuable to the current discussion. If an ecosystem is to be valued
or recognized as a habitat for a particular species, and thus recognized to have certain
characteristics which make it a habitat, one cannot simply attribute these characteristics to a small
portion of the biodiversity components within the system. Because these components are largely
connected and each needed to maintain the other, the property of being a habitat lies not in a few
choice species but in the entire system which provides those conditions.
The third major problem with communities investigated by MacLaurin and Sterelny is the
“boundary” problem, which regards the idea that “if communities are ecological systems with
casually salient properties, then, presumably, they have objective boundaries too” (MacLaurin
and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 124). In other words, there must be “a zone after which we stop counting,
as addition to diversity there makes no difference to the extent of buffering here” (MacLaurin and
Sterelny, 2008, pp. 124). As was mentioned earlier, the authors concede that abiotic, physical
conditions do not need to change markedly across ecosystem borders, nor must it be clear which
ecosystems or communities certain populations belong to. Basing their analysis on the assertion
by Richard Lewontin and Richard Levins that communities are defined by the differences
between relatively “strong” and “weak” interactions, MacLaurin and Sterelny present only one
criterion for an ecosystem's borders: the “clumping” of interactions. The root of the problem
stems from the lack of consistent empirical or logical evidence for this clumping.
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My argument concerning the boundary problem is similar to that for other obstacles to
the notion of communities and ecosystems; simply because one factor is not immediately
apparent and consistently so between all ecosystems does not mean it does not exist. There are
some ecosystems—once again, biogenic and highly competitive ecosystems are great examples—
for which boundaries are inherently obvious. The strong interactions between coral and various
coral-reliant species end where coral stop growing, where the proper substrate for the ecosystem
ends. Though various species who affect the reef may leave it and enter other communities and
ecosystems regularly, being affected by organisms there, the interactions of these species with
those in both ecosystems are likely weaker, thus still enabling the rough designation of a
“boundary” by the definition of Lewontin and Levins. It must be carefully noted that there will be
exceptions to this rule; if nothing else is clear from texts in the philosophy of biology, it is that the
natural world and disciplines which study it are constant sources of exceptions.
As before, my way of accounting for the inconsistency of ecosystems in their clarity and
distinctness is to place them on a continuum regarding the factors discussed above. Some
ecosystems (like my biogenic examples) are particularly distinct; their boundaries end when a
specific set of species stops appearing and can be delineated directly. Other ecosystems, usually
those with high abiotic stresses that prevent equilibrium conditions and competitive or mutualistic
interaction among species, lack complex (or as complex) webs of interaction and may have much
more subtle communities that are difficult to distinguish. At the same time, there are communities
and ecosystems that are distinct sources of biological variation in the strength and complexity of
their interactions, have clearer boundaries, more obvious (and often important) ecosystem
services, and stronger and more numerous strong interactions between more other sources of
biodiversity like species. Not all ecosystems are created equal. Some contribute more and some
less to biological diversity independent of the phenomena they contain, and those that contribute
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more will be more important targets for conservation in addition to the components of
biodiversity which exist within them (IE the species and their respective populations).
From a practical standpoint, such a model is quite useful. Not only does it explain the
vast differences in “problem” characteristics observable between different communities, but it
enables a distinction between ecosystems which would benefit immensely from Norton's
“ecosystem health” approach to conservation and those for which individual species would
benefit more from independent conservation measures. In light of the habitat issue raised before,
it is logical that organisms which need a specific ecosystem to survive are those who need clearly
bounded and interaction-heavy ecosystems; these species have more obvious collective properties
and more prominent organism interactions. If an endangered species lived in an environment in
which it had few specific interactions but many more general and weaker ones with a variety of
organisms, one specific set of these organisms would not only be difficult to recognize but would
be less important for the conservation of that species. It would always have another set to rely on,
another area to shift its biological “weight”.
Thus, while I will not make the ecologically troubling assertion that ecosystems are not
sources of biological variation or aspects of nature which should be valued independently of the
diversity they contain, I will certainly concede that not all ecosystems have equal value as sources
of biodiversity. In other words, all ecosystems fall within a spectrum whose endpoints are defined
by two (purely theoretical) ecosystem types. On the far left (this side was chosen arbitrarily) is a
“community of indifference” in its purest state, in which the ecosystem itself has no independent
value as a source of biodiversity, having no emergent properties, very unclear boundaries for
conservation, and little to no deterministic species interaction which necessitates explanation
beyond shared distribution. On the right side of the spectrum is the ideological holist community
whose value as a biodiversity source is completely independent of its members. The ecosystem
has obvious physical boundaries and all species within it rely so heavily upon one another that
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their distribution is solely based on shared presence and the establishment of habitat. The
ecosystem exhibits a number of valuable and easily distinguishable emergent properties such as
ecosystem services and providing habitat for an immense number of species which are absolutely
incapable of surviving without the whole ecosystem. I hypothesize that all ecosystems fall
between these extremes, and thus for the purpose of identifying biodiversity, ecosystems are a
matter of degree. Their contribution to biodiversity (and as will be asserted, subsequently their
value) varies between ecosystems.
I.8 An Inclusive Biodiversity Definition
By this point an inclusive and multifaceted approach to defining biodiversity has been
completed. Starting with the “calculus analogy”, the most fundamental source of biological
variation, species, was included after some specification, followed by several of its “derivatives”
(I use the term only in analogy), including morphology, development, and behavior. Finally, a
new model for defining the biodiversity of ecosystems was presented which acknowledges them
as a variable source of biodiversity with degrees of value (again, a term used lightly) independent
of their parts. In this way, it is clear that the term biodiversity represents a great variety of natural
phenomena which are identifiable, measurable, and unique to different degrees. While species are
assessed according to taxonomic or phylogenetic distinctness and ecosystems by their coherence,
phenotypic plasticity creates developmental variety distinct from other sources. Behavioral and
morphological differences, in addition to developmental variation, account for the biodiversity
observed within species not included in the customary “species count” evaluations of
biodiversity. The result of these observations is the formation of an inclusive definition of
biodiversity, one which encompasses the myriad natural phenomena both incorporated in and
influencing the continued process of evolution.
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While it is indeed a great step forward to formulate a well-informed and inclusive
account of all that we value in the earth's biota, one great uncertainty remains which until the
present—to avoid complication—has been avoided. That is, the subsequent question to our
current claim, “This is valuable to us.” How valuable? Needless to say, while a formalized
definition of biodiversity is a great conceptual resource, before it can have any practical
application the value of concepts defined must be clarified, starting first with a surprisingly
formidable stumbling block for conservation biologists: Why conserve biodiversity?

Section II: Why Conserve Biodiversity?

II.1 The Intuitive Consensus
While it is helpful to have a concept of what exactly human beings value as biodiversity,
and just how far such a definition goes, there is still a major logical gap between a definition of
biodiversity and the application of appropriate conservation measures. A justification for
biodiversity conservation is needed; specifically, a compelling answer to the question “Why
conserve biodiversity?” The question is surprisingly difficult to confront. Indeed, what sort of
value does biodiversity hold, and how does this compare to the prioritization of certain social and
economic issues? What sort of obligations on a moral or ethical basis do human beings hold
concerning the components of biological variety outlined earlier, and where do these obligations
come from? According to Sahotra Sarkar, “to get such an obligation” toward biodiversity and the
environment, “we have to analyze carefully the nature of our relation to the environment. For
instance...whether the environment embodies some set of values that requires us to refrain from
harming it” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 6). For many people, it is intuitively clear that such value exists.
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As Bryan Norton explains, “Any discussion of the value of biological diversity should start with
the recognition of the breadth of consensus favoring the protection of biological resources”
(Norton, 2003, pp. 116). The problem for biodiversity conservationists is thus not an issue of
agreeing that such values and the obligations that come with them exist, but how exactly those
values are attributed.
Fortunately, there is no shortage of ethical systems being applied to this problem.
Strategies range from the existence of intrinsic values to the interests of future generations and
nearly all conceivable possibilities in between, not to mention appeals to ecosystem services and
the potential to alter human preferences. In fact, the number is so great that any account of
biodiversity ethics usually starts with a “Goldilocks” approach to the subject, reviewing briefly
each main category of valuation and eventually settling on one which is “just right”. Though this
section will follow this trend to some extent, it should be clearly stated that the goal of this work
is for practical application, and that ethics will be chosen on this basis. Consequently, it is not in
my interest to denounce or devalue any particular ethical framework, only to review the criticisms
each has received and compare their practical advantages and disadvantages with others.

II.2 Adequacy Conditions for a Biodiversity Conservation Ethic
Before one can make a consistent analysis of a set of conservation ethics, a framework
for analysis must be provided by which these ethics can be assessed. A set of criteria would be
useful by which to compare and contrast the ethical consequences and conclusions characteristic
of different perspectives. In his 2005 work, “Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy”,
Sahotra Sarkar provides a stringent set of conditions that must be met before a conservation ethic
can be considered acceptable. While it is not my interest to “rank” conservation ethics and make
any normative claims regarding how other human beings should interact with the world around
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them, I believe Sarkar's “Adequacy Conditions for a Conservationist Ethic” provide a solid
foundation for analysis. These conditions will be reviewed in depth to set the stage for an
investigation of prominent approaches to conservation ethics.
Early in the text, Sarkar selects six conditions which serve as the basis for his analysis of
various contemporary conservation ethics. The first of these conditions, called the generality
condition, is directly related to part I of this work. According to Sarkar, in order to satisfy this
condition, an ethic should attribute value “to biodiversity in general, in all its complexity”
(Sarkar, 2005, pp. 48). The importance of this condition is intuitive, if not rational by definition.
If biodiversity consists of the components of natural systems which humans value (including their
variation), then, naturally, at least some value should be attributed to each of these components as
they occur in a natural system. This condition makes no assertions as to how much value should
be attributed to various components of biodiversity, only that some should. This leaves some
much-needed flexibility for the formation of an ethic according to such a complex definition of
biodiversity. For the purposes of this work, the only alteration to this condition shall be that the
definition of biodiversity in use is that presented in section I of this work, and not that adopted by
Sarkar.
This condition forms the foundation of any biodiversity ethic and forms the first of two
parts of the “objective” of biodiversity conservation, simply the preservation of endangered
biological phenomena. A second condition, however, is necessary in order to ensure this objective
is met. Even if all components of biodiversity are attributed some value, it does not mean that
they will be conserved as a result.
The second condition, the “moral force condition” concerns the ethical obligations
involved with the value mentioned above. In order to satisfy this condition, an ethic must
“produce an obligation to attempt to conserve all biodiversity” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 49),
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necessitating human action and management to some degree. Thus, not only must value be
attributed to components of biodiversity, but when these components and their value are
threatened, an ethic must create cause for action. This condition, too, has clear priority in an ethic
and is difficult to dispute. Components of biodiversity which human beings value must be
protected when threatened, so policies must generate an obligation to protect those phenomena
that are valued. A conservation ethic is thus not practically useful unless it generates the need for
“real-world” action distinct from conceptual recognition of value. This condition is naturally an
integral part of a working conservation ethic and for the analysis of this work will be considered
the most important.
Sarkar's “collectivity” condition states that a conservation ethic must have some holist
element, attributing value not only to individual organisms but to the broader taxonomic groups
of which they are part and the ecosystems and habitats which they support and are supported by.
According to Sarkar, a conservation ethic must “attribute value to other higher-level entities along
both the structural and taxonomic hierarchies” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 49). Thus, Sarkar makes a clear
stand on the holist vs. individualist debate mentioned in part I, and couples a holist framework to
the ideal conservation ethic. In the context of the definition of biodiversity constructed in part I, it
should also be noted that the generality condition mentioned earlier may partly overlap this
condition by attributing value to ecosystems and larger structural units. Higher taxonomic units,
however, are uniquely covered by this condition.
It should be noted that the attribution of value to taxonomic and ecological units larger
than individual organisms is a heavily debated subject. Though it was generally established in
part I that these larger units will be given value, this condition is given secondary importance
given that its fundamental concepts are not universally accepted.
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The logic behind this condition seems to be sourced in the precautionary principle, with
the idea that though some value cannot be readily attributed to some biological phenomena
(higher taxonomic units like families, for instance), this does not imply that such value may not
exist. While there is uncertainty regarding the value of higher taxonomic classes, Sarkar seems to
assert that a good ethic still gives them value. Due to these uncertainties, the importance of this
condition for the purposes of this work is diminished with relation to higher classes. In relation to
ecosystems and habitats, its purpose may already be served by the first condition.
Touching upon the idea of taxonomic classes once more, Sarkar adds the “All-taxa”
condition, which requires that an ethic attribute value to all species and classes, not simply
charismatic species. Needless to say, this sort of condition is a necessary one, as conservation
measures and effort toward the preservation of charismatic megafauna are notoriously greater
than those toward less appealing species (to use a famous example, the snail darter). The all-taxa
definition requires that an ethic provide solid justification for the preferential “treatment” of one
species or taxa over another. Presumably, this sort of justification involves some comparison in
the value attributed in previous conditions by some scientific of philosophical model. This
question is addressed in Sarkar's next adequacy condition.
The next condition is one of considerable practical concern. The “priority-setting”
condition requires that an ethic provide some framework for the prioritization of species and other
components of biodiversity in relation to one another. For conservation measures, such a
framework is essential. Naturally, resources for conservation efforts are limited and thus must be
focused toward the biological phenomena of greatest value or of the most urgent need of
conservation management. Without such a priority-setting framework, an ethic would prevent the
effective preservation of valuable biological phenomena and thus fail its primary objective. Due
to the practical emphasis of this work, this condition will be considered important and stressed in
subsequent ethical analysis.
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Sarkar's sixth and final condition is also the one he considers the least important. What he
calls the “non-anthropocentrism” condition predictably requires that a conservation ethic allows
the “attribution of value without reference to parochial human interests” (Sarkar, 2005, pp., 50). It
is understandable why such a priority would be considered less important. If the main objective of
the ethic is still to properly conserve endangered biological phenomena, it seems reasonable to
say that this objective may be independent of the justification used for action. The requisite
conclusion for this logic is that if humans are the source of justification for biodiversity
conservation, the necessity for conservation is only present as long as humans are, too.

While this may seem initially problematic, when taking a broad enough ecological
perspective on the relationships between biological phenomena and the biosphere as a
whole, this relationship would be maintained unless humans were completely absent from
earth. Thinking logically and environmentally, this absence would also eliminate the
anthropogenic risk of extinction, the type of problem upon which conservation measures
focus.

With this in mind, the non-anthropocentric condition is also treated with
secondary importance. Based on the assumption that conservation should combat only
anthropogenic biodiversity loss (thus avoiding “species hoarding”), anthropogenic
problems will only arise in the presence of humans, and when that presence is removed
(from all interactions, thus the entire biosphere) the necessity for action dissipates. Thus,
for the purposes of this work, an anthropocentric ethic is still considered acceptable as
long as it obeys the above conditions, especially the satisfaction of the moral force and
generality conditions. It should be noted that this argument does not by any means
discredit or disprove non-anthropocentric ethics, but provides some rationale that the
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interests of anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric ethics may overlap to a large degree,
and that differences between them may be considered trivial for the practical purposes of
this work.

That being said, the non-anthropocentric condition is certainly not an unwanted condition
for an ethic; many thinkers insist that an anthropocentric view is immoral and unethical. Thus, if
an ethic could possibly satisfy the arguments of these thinkers, it would certainly add to the value
and applicability of the ethic.
In light of the practical focus of this work, I would like to introduce an additional
adequacy condition, one that is relevant to the application of an ethic. What I will call the
“comprehensibility” condition, which states that in order to be effective, a conservation ethic
must be readily understandable for the average person. Additionally, an ethic must be effective in
small-scale conservation decisions of the sort that nearly all human beings make on a daily if not
hourly basis. Such decisions occur frequently and in huge numbers, the majority of the time
independently of federal law or its enforcement. For example, whether to buy products that may
be harvested, produced, or disposed of unsustainably, whether to use fire to clear a plot of land at
the risk of burning nearby forest, or whether to throw back an endangered fish when caught. This
sort of decisions are frequently not governed by federal conservation laws, inconsistently
regulated between political boundaries, or insufficiently enforced. The “comprehensibility”
condition thus necessitates that an ethic allow all (if not the vast majority of) people to have an
intuitive understanding of a conservation ethic and have the ability to apply it when the need
arises. It should be noted that whether or not people are obligated to obey this ethic will depend
on the satisfaction of the “moral force” condition explained earlier. Due to the increasing number
of conservation decisions, conscious or otherwise, being made by human beings on a daily basis
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and the relatively poor enforcement of environmental laws in certain parts of the world, this
adequacy condition is given importance secondary only to the generality and moral force
conditions.
For the following investigation of contemporary conservation ethics, the primary criteria
for a working ethic will be called the “core” adequacy conditions, namely the generality and
moral force conditions. The prioritization and comprehensibility conditions are placed in the
category of “practical” adequacy conditions. The all-taxa and collectivity conditions are
considered subsets of the generality condition that simply specify ways in which it should include
particular components of biodiversity. The non-anthropocentric condition will be considered
unessential but still beneficial. These three conditions will form the “secondary” adequacy
condition group for their diminished importance with regard to the purposes of this analysis.
Using this framework for assessment, I will review the most prominent ethical systems in
conservation biology and attempt to outline those which show the most promise for application.

II.3 Intrinsic Value Ethics
Since the time when Aldo Leopold's “Land Ethic” sparked interest and discussion of our
philosophical relationship to the environment, appeals to the intrinsic value of natural phenomena
have been immensely popular. Before this, many spiritual and religious philosophies attributed
such value to natural phenomena. Sahotra Sarkar explains that ethics of intrinsic value claim that
an entity, rather than a quality, has value, and thus attribute such value irrespective of any
instrumental or other quality of the entity (Sarkar, 2005). He further classifies intrinsic value
systems as being one of two types. The first is a system in which value is attributed to an entity
without comparison to anything else; this sort of intrinsic value is directly opposed to extrinsic
value, or any value emerging from a relation to another entity. The second type is a system in
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which an entity is valued without regarding it as a means to any sort of end, but instead as an end
in and of itself. This Kantian perspective is of course the opposite of instrumental value systems
in which an entity receives its value because of its potential use to others.
Holmes Rolston III (1989) presents an environmental ethic built on the foundation of
intrinsic value. Rolston's ethic represents what Sarkar defined as the first “type” of intrinsic value
ethic, focusing on the value of entities (in this case, species) independent of the existence of any
other entities. Rolston supports his position that all species have such inalienable and intrinsic
value by making an analogy with the human ethic, arguing that in the same way people have a
duty not to end one-another’s lives, it is also our responsibility not to end the unique lineage of a
species. In Rolston's words, “Humans have learned some intraspecific altruism. The challenge
now is to learn interspecific altruism” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 208). Rolston argues that as greater
processes related to forms of life, species have intrinsic value beyond their use to an ecosystem or
any human needs. Citing a variety of species including the Beggars tick, a pesky plant family
with adhesive seeds of which one particular species is endangered, Rolston makes it clear that
though all species may not have instrumental value, there is still some value present that humans,
as ethically concerned organisms, cannot ignore.
Rolston's arguments for the existence of this value are focused less on distinct proof
(after all, this would be difficult if not impossible) but in criticizing opposing views. Rolston
explains that anthropocentric perspectives are “submoral and fundamentally exploitative” and
insists that ethical systems are “about partners with entwined destinies” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 208).
In this way, Rolston illustrates his view that anthropocentric ethics are inherently immoral and
opposing to our own moral standards toward one another. “Morality,” he explains, “is needed
whenever the vulnerable must be protected from the powerful” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 211).
Certainly, this statement applies to the current interaction of humans and the rest of the biosphere.
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Rolston addresses another criticism of intrinsic value with regard to species, one which
could also be posed toward any of the other myriad components of biodiversity outlined earlier.
“Perhaps species do not exist” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 209) Rolston muses, facing the problem that
moral obligations cannot exist toward phenomena that are nonexistent. Here, he makes an
argument similar to my own in the first section of this work regarding ecosystems and habitats;
while the boundaries are not always clear and while classification is always different, species, like
geological phenomena, are “phenomena objectively there to be mapped” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 210)
and thus unquestionably exist, despite uncertainty of how they exist. From there, he makes the
simple step of asserting that certain duties exist to these phenomena, explaining that, though there
is no moral “contract” between humans and other species, the same duties apply regardless of a
pen-and-paper agreement. Because of our position of power, it is our duty to ensure that our
actions do not cause undue harm to biological phenomena, regardless of their value to us.
In fact, Rolston extends this morality, explaining that the question “Ought species X to
exist?” is simply “a single increment in the collective question 'ought life on Earth to exist?'”
(Rolston, 1989, pp. 212) to which the (hopefully) obvious answer is yes. Thus, with each
anthropogenic extinction, human beings are essentially conceding that there is no value to life
itself; by failing to attribute value to a larger unit of life, we are essentially arguing that there may
be no value to the larger whole. The extinction of a species, Rolston argues, is a form of
“superkilling”, which is either equally or more morally deplorable because it extinguishes not
only a single life form but an evolutionary trajectory of forms. He asserts that modern human
beings are faced with a unique situation as the first “superkillers” on earth. With the technological
and numeric potential to remove entire forms of life from the biosphere and thus the ability to
commit superkilling, a new and more sensitive ethic is required of humans in the 20th century.
“If,” Rolston concludes, “in this world of uncertain moral convictions, it makes any sense to
claim that one ought not to kill individuals without justification, it makes more sense to claim that
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one ought not to superkill the species, without superjustification” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 213). Thus,
a greater form of justification is needed to risk the extinction of an entire species than would be
needed to risk the lives of the individuals making up that species.
Rolston also extends this ethic to ecosystems, insisting that the goal of conservation is
“not [simply] the preservation of species but of species in the system that we desire” (Rolston,
1989, pp. 216). Naturally, if species and the forms of life which make them up are being valued,
the ecosystems which they form and on which they depend are additionally important; these
ecosystems are part of the evolutionary process in which these species are involved and form the
support network which allows them to continue. Using this logic, it may also be reasonable to
extend this ethic of intrinsic value to other components of biodiversity. This extrapolation
requires the acceptance of on a few assumptions, however, notably that the arguments made in
the first part of this work regarding what phenomena contribute to biodiversity are true. If
agreement has been reached regarding which elements characterize biological variety, the ethic of
intrinsic value can be extended to some degree to all of these components with respect to their
contributions. It is, however, unclear how far this sort of “life ethic” can be extended and how
much intrinsic value will be attributed to different components of biodiversity.
Rolston makes an initially convincing case for the attribution of absolute value to other
forms of life and possibly other biological phenomena related to the perpetuation of life. It is
difficult to argue against such value when considering the “paradox that the single moral species
acts only in its collective self interest toward all the rest” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 212). Indeed, there
is an intuitive pull to this concept which makes it difficult to deny. However, it remains to be seen
how this value system satisfies the adequacy conditions outlined earlier for an effective
conservation ethic.
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As mentioned above, it may be possible to extend Rolston's more sensitive ethic of
intrinsic value to other components of biodiversity, because, as established in part I, these
components all make some contribution to the variation and perpetuation of life in the biosphere.
In this way, while it was initially directed only toward species, Rolston's ethic to prevent the
“superkilling” of biological phenomena on a greater scale than simple individuals can be
transformed into a “life ethic” which encompasses all recognized components of biodiversity. It
may thus satisfy the first adequacy condition, which necessitates that it attributes value to all
aspects of biodiversity which are desirable to value. By definition, it satisfies the “nonanthropocentrism” condition, though this does not make any significant contribution to its
practical application. Additionally, it would conceivably satisfy the all-taxa condition by
attributing such intrinsic value to all natural phenomena, regardless of their appeal to humans or
other uses. The collectivity condition is addressed by Rolston's extension of the ethic to
ecosystems and larger taxonomic classes, which will be valued as larger units of the “life” which
is given intrinsic value. The moral force condition of this rather powerful ethic is undoubtedly
satisfied; no human being wants to be classified as a “superkiller”. Rolston makes it clear that the
same duties and obligations we normally assign to other human beings also apply to other forms
of life, what he calls a “biologically sounder ethic, though it revises what was formerly thought
logically permissible or ethically binding” (Rolston, 1989, pp. 215). Additionally, the
comprehensibility condition is satisfied by the simple extension of the “moral circle” used in
Rolston's ethic. There is no need for excessive contemplation, simply the understanding that
humans have a great capacity to destroy other forms of life, and that morality and ethical
consideration naturally arise in such situations. This thought process is likely intuitive to a great
number of people.
The main problem(s) with this ethic arise in response to its objective measurement. While
it is clear that value will be attributed to all aspects of biodiversity, it is very difficult to say how
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much. The ethic contains no conceivable method of prioritization, and thus would be virtually
impossible to implement in a legal setting. Besides that, there is little logical basis for this
extension of morals. While it does, indeed, obey virtually the same logic as the “golden rule”
perspective on human ethics, it would be very difficult to convince lawmakers that such an
extension is necessary. As other authors have admitted, such ethics of intrinsic value are “little
help in policy matters” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 118) and pose “important difficulties
for those who seek to integrate environmental ethics with scientific practice” (MacLaurin and
Sterelny, 2008, pp. 150). Indeed, though there is intuitive draw to ethics like Rolston's, it is not
necessarily enough to prove its own case; thus it is a difficult “feeling” to justify, and even harder
to really apply.
A number of potentially problematic situations come to mind with respect to this
difficulty. Any comparative dilemma, for instance, where the value of one species needed to be
weighed against the other, would be immensely difficult, like deciding whether to save one baby
versus another from a burning building. Some concrete method of prioritizing species is
necessary to enable the use of such an ethic, or else it does little but reinforce the already
commonly-held suspicion that it is better to prevent the loss of a species than to promote it.
Additionally, this type of approach presents interesting implications for other types of
“biodiversity”, for instance, man-made biodiversity in the form of livestock or other domestic
breeds. Are certain duties due to milk cows to avoid the “superkilling” of one unique bloodline,
or will value somehow be diminished for certain types of species? It seems strange to consider
preserving a population that humans themselves “created” in the first place. Without proper
prioritization, it is impossible to justify the decision to conserve a specific coral reef or prevent
the loss of a new color of pansies. Though the intuitive appeal of this approach is undeniable, it is
clear that its lack of logically-binding justification makes implementation difficult.
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This is not to say that there have not been more logically-based justifications for the
attribution of intrinsic value. Sahotra Sarkar reviews a number of these systems in the third
chapter of Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy: An Introduction, though he finds all of
them unsatisfactory according to the adequacy conditions outlined earlier.
For example, appeals to the value of sentient beings are considered unacceptable because
it fails the collectivity and all-taxa conditions. Naturally, some organisms might not be considered
sentient—for example a bacterium or plant—and these would be excluded from ethical
consideration. Perhaps even more troublesome, aspects of biodiversity outlined in the first section
of this work that are non-sentient (essentially everything aside from individual organisms) would
also be outside of ethical consideration. This sort of justification would thus fail to accomplish its
objective of preserving what we consider valuable biological phenomena. Additionally, issues
like the culling of particular species to avoid the destruction of habitats or extinction of other
species become problematic, because prioritization of values (unless measured simply in number
of sentient lives saved) is also virtually impossible.
Other attempts to logically justify intrinsic value ethics, such as Paul Taylor’s “Respect
for Nature” ethic stem from appeals to interests or a “will-to-live” in an attempt to attribute
intrinsic value to the interests of organisms, thus eliminating the issue of sentience (Taylor,
1986). In order to have intrinsic value, an organism must simply have some form of “preference”
in that it behaves a certain way, preferring certain conditions over others. However, not only is it
incredibly hard to quantify and attribute a “will-to-live” or “will-to-reproduce”, but again it
requires a logical stretch to assign such interests to non-organismal components of biodiversity,
such as higher taxonomic classes, types of behavior, ecosystems, and so on. Thus, the collectivity
condition is again left unsatisfied, and these logical attempts at assigning intrinsic value to
biological phenomena are largely unsuccessful.
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From the preceding analysis, it seems likely that logical justifications for the attribution
of intrinsic value are largely fruitless and unsatisfactory for the formation of a biodiversity ethic.
In fact, the only somewhat acceptable perspective on this ethic would be Rolston's rather intuitive
understanding that human beings require a more sensitive ethic now that they are capable of
causing much greater destruction to the biosphere. Again, ignoring the need for rational
justification and purely logical thought, there is great moral pull to the argument that the purpose
of morality is to intervene where the weak must be protected from the strong, and that in our
current position of immense strength, human beings may indeed have need for an ethic which can
encourage such morality. While admittedly useless for policymaking and large-scale decisions,
there does seem to be some value in this form of ethic. As Sahotra Sarkar explains, intrinsic value
ethics are “endorsed on the grounds that [they] will lead to a better attitude on our part in our
interactions with other living forms” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 58), and not necessarily for governments
to create and enforce laws. According to Sarkar, the idea “that a new attitude toward the
nonhuman world, an attitude different form the one we customarily display, would better
safeguard biodiversity and environmental health, is almost certainly correct” (Sarkar, 2005, pp.
59). The point Sarkar makes here is an important one considering the importance and utility of
intrinsic value arguments. While they may be of little use for decisions as a governmental level,
they encourage a more careful and morally-bound attitude toward the natural world on the part of
every human being who encounters them, and thus can contribute to conservation on a broader,
“grass-roots” scale. It is not hard to imagine how an ethical, intuitive justification for
conservation might appeal more to an uneducated or scientifically apathetic individual, while
complicated logical explanations citing utilitarian and biological benefits of biodiversity might
fall short. Thus, while an ethic of intrinsic value does not belong in the field of lawmaking, it
certainly has its place in the future of conservation.
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II.4 Demand Value Ethics: The Anthropocentric Approach
The second large category of conservation ethic is composed of all those which attempt
to attribute value to biological phenomena relative to their importance to other organisms or
interest groups. These ethics include the anthropocentric justifications for conservation often
decried as base and immoral by intrinsic value conservationists. Naturally, this category of
instrumental and extrinsic value is the polar opposite of ethical systems discussed earlier, and
focuses on the use of more rational rather than intuitive concepts to support its claims.
In their discussion of ethics in What is Biodiversity? James MacLaurin and Kim Sterelny
describe such utilitarian attempts at attributing value as “demand value”. According to the
authors, demand value systems stem from “theories that tie the moral worth of an action to its
effects on the maximization of minimization of some natural property” (MacLaurin and Sterelny,
2008, pp. 151), notably happiness, pleasure, or “well-being” or the minimization of negative
properties like unhappiness. These are measured by the interests of various groups in the subject
at hand, in this case any organism benefited by the biological phenomena valued as biodiversity.
The obvious issue with such values is what the authors call the “aggregation problem”
(MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 152), which essentially poses the question “valuable to
whom?” The idea of demand value results in a “weighing of interests” between individuals that
can lead to the question of which demands are worth appeasing and which aren't. Naturally, a
squirrel has different demands than a dairy farmer, and the subsequent conflict of interests therein
would be difficult to account for from a conservation standpoint. It would be difficult to satisfy
many of our earlier-outlined adequacy conditions without being clear which sort of interests were
being given value. Specific interest groups must be identified in order to enable the use of
demand value arguments for conservation.
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To avoid the aggregation problem, many philosophers refer to a specific set of interests,
notably human interests. These anthropocentric arguments focus on economic, social, and even
spiritual benefits which components of biodiversity can provide to humans. With regard to such
ethics, “the values involved in protecting biodiversity are fully represented in an accounting of
the welfare of humans in the present and in the future” (Norton, 2003, pp. 117). Thus,
components of biodiversity are valued for their properties as resources for human use. In
“Searching for Sustainability: Interdisciplinary Essays in the Philosophy of Conservation
Biology” Bryan Norton insists that “Protection of biological diversity can be justified because of
the many ways in which species and ecosystems provide services that we would otherwise have
to supply. In general, anthropocentric justifications easily satisfy the moral force condition by
showing the utility of a biological phenomenon directly to human beings, which would place
conservation directly in their best interest. The priority-setting condition may also be satisfied,
given the human ability to attribute monetary and economic value to most resources and benefits.
“Willingness to pay” surveys are commonly used to attribute this type of value to phenomena
which are not readily monetarized. In this way, biological phenomena could be valued by the
monetary worth of the services or benefits they provide, and prioritized in order of value. The
comprehensibility condition is also easily satisfied, because the logic to conserve something that
benefits oneself is relatively straight-forward.
Issues arise when faced with the generality condition (and its specific sub-conditions, the
collectivity and all-taxa condition), as it is not clear how distinct values can be attributed to each
and every part of a broad and inclusive definition of biodiversity. The possibility arises that a
species or ecosystem characteristic exists that no one can directly benefit from in a utilitarian
fashion. This possibility fails to satisfy the all-taxa condition, which states that all species (and
other biological phenomena), even those which are not particularly charismatic or immediately
useful, be attributed value. Needless to say, a “worthless” species would be indefensible from the
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perspective of demand value. The problem here is that demand value “does not tie to diversity per
se. Rather, it ties [value] to specific uses” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 153). One attempt
to resolve these collectivity conditions is through the citation of the diversity-stability hypothesis.
The diversity-stability hypothesis is usually the first intuitively satisfactory move for the
creation of an anthropocentric conservation ethic which satisfies the generality condition. This
hypothesis links biodiversity (in all its forms) to the stability of a specific ecosystem or collective
body (be it a population or biome). In so doing, it places value on all aspects of biodiversity by
stressing that each of these aspects is at least somewhat important to the stability of the
ecosystem. Also keeping in mind that the biosphere itself depends on the contributions of many
ecosystems and populations through ecosystem services and other functions, it follows that each
component of biodiversity has some value given its contribution to the perpetuation of these
services.
The diversity-stability hypothesis, at its very simplest, relies on the ecological concept of
functional redundancy. Functional redundancy is the phenomenon when a single ecosystem (or
community) has more than one member that can fulfill a particular role or niche. Thus, if
conditions change that make it difficult for one species to survive, other species can fill in their
place and make sure the role is still fulfilled. Diversity thus provides additional functional
redundancy. The idea, then, is that this additional functional redundancy makes ecosystems and
subsequently the entire biosphere more stable and capable of continuing in the face of change.
In the last few decades, the diversity-stability hypothesis and the ethical conclusions
which can be drawn from it have come under attack in the works of several different authors.
These researchers showed that certain cases existed in which diversity decreased stability.
Though initially this seems to be an insurmountable defeat of this line of thinking, this is not
necessarily the case. As MacLaurin and Sterelny explain, one of the main critics of the hypothesis

58

researcher, Robert May (1973) identified biodiversity only as species richness, and thus excluded
the vast majority of other components discussed in part I of this work (MacLaurin and Sterelny,
2008). Additionally, fault may be found in May's definition of stability, which referenced only
population size; specifically, the population size of individual species involved in the ecosystem
(MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008). Naturally, given the explanation of functional redundancy
above, the diversity-stability hypothesis makes no reference to the stability of individual
populations; in fact by definition it functions to account for such natural fluctuations. More
specifically, the concept of ecosystem stability is not that populations will remain constant, but
that the effects of one fluctuating population on its environment will be buffered by another
population with different characteristics and thus different population fluctuations under the same
conditions.
In the same study, the stability of ecosystem services is found to increase. Other
researchers, notably David Tilman argue that these properties are what become more stable in
more diverse communities, and that more diverse communities are more productive (MacLaurin
and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 122). Much of the research done in this area, however, was based entirely
on plants (Tilman 1996, 1999, Tilman et al. 2005) and may not apply as easily to more complex
animal and plant-animal relationships.
Sahotra Sarkar is equally skeptical of the formation of an ethic around the diversitystability hypothesis, explaining that other authors “have produced equally compelling empirical
evidence that richness is inversely coordinated with stability, interpreted as resilience and
resistance.” While again, as with the case of Tilman and May, the definitions used for this
research may be criticized, it is clear that opinions vary greatly as to the utility of the diversitystability hypothesis.
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Thus, though according to some there is a near-consensus that the positive relationship
between diversity and stability exists (Hooper et al., 2005), the subject is still “hot”.
Subsequently, some authors eschew its use in conservation ethics entirely due to the criticisms it
has received and the uncertainty behind it. Both Sarkar and MacLaurin and Sterelny chose to
abandon the diversity-stability hypothesis in the formation of their conservation ethics and,
interestingly enough, end up making similar ethical appeals in the process. The ethics created by
these authors form a third category in which ethics are based on appeals to the precautionary
principle or the somewhat abstract idea of “prudence”.

II.5 Precautionary Ethics
In Biodiversity and Environmental Philosophy: An Introduction Sahotra Sarkar (2005)
addresses the concept of “transformative values”, which attribute a sort of intellectual value to
biodiversity. According to Sarkar, biological phenomena have transformative value because they
have the ability to change a human being's perspective or preferences. In other words, rather than
having direct demand value, biological phenomena hold value in the potential to change such
demand values. Sarkar presents two types of transformative values, direct and indirect. Direct
transformative values are attributed to phenomena which can bring about a change of demand
values, while indirect transformative value is attributed to those which can lead to other events
that transform demand values. (Sarkar, 2005) In this way, direct transformation value stems
simply from the experience of a certain phenomena, while indirect value is brought about by its
potential intellectual contributions.
Biodiversity is thus being valued for its intellectual appeal and only that. In Sarkar's
words, “the best argument for the conservation of biodiversity remains its intellectual promise”
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(Sarkar, 2005, pp. 85). Value is thus due to objects which can change our intellectual points of
view and the values which come from them.
The most obvious—and potentially most challenging opposition to this type of argument
is the “directionality problem”, which addresses the possibility of negative transformative value.
After all, if value is simply being placed on the changes in value a biological phenomenon can
bring about, it is not specified that this change must be a good thing. It would make little sense to
attribute value to a negative experience with biodiversity. Hypothetically speaking, we would not
want to value a species or behavior of some organism that was so incredibly unpleasant it induces
undesirable changes in human values; for instance causing them to stop valuing their own or
other human lives. Sarkar's initial response to this objection is to claim that such negative
experiences are highly unlikely, and that a component of biodiversity “is much more likely to
have positive than negative transformative value” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 98). Accepting that this may
not be the most convincing answer—indeed, for some it may not be convincing at all—Sarkar
adds that “the most convincing argument in response to the directionality problem is based on the
indirect transformation of demand values that biodiversity generates through its contributions to
science” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 99). In this way, the potential for new scientific discovery and
understanding as a result of biodiversity research is considered the most promising source of
value for components of biodiversity. Thus, as biological phenomena are employed as subjects of
research or sources of inspiration for further intellectual understanding, they create an indirect
benefit to human beings. According to Sarkar, the only potential negative change resulting from
knowledge of biodiversity would be further discoveries of agents of biological warfare. It is thus
much more likely that scientific research on components of biodiversity would be beneficial than
harmful. As Sarkar explains, “Given how much we have yet to learn about the variety of life on
Earth, biodiversity studies have more potential in this way than probably any other field” (Sarkar,
2005, pp. 103). Through this line of thinking, it is evident that while the viability of direct

61

transformative value is certainly crippled by the directionality problem, indirect transformative
value may still maintain some utility through its connections to science and other forms of
intellectual development.
James MacLaurin and Kim Sterelny ultimately make a similar argument for the
attribution of value to biodiversity, referring to what they call the “Option value Option”. This
idea of value stems from the concept that a thing’s value is in the options (or freedoms) it can
provide in the future. Thus, something is valued not just for its use in the present, but for the
possibilities of its future value; option value becomes a way for humans to “hedge their bets”
when it comes to biodiversity resulting in an ethical system which “links utility much more
closely to diversity” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 154). This “option value” is not at all
unlike Sarkar's indirect form of transformational value, which attributes value to phenomena
whose presence can lead to discoveries or experiences which change our preferences. In fact, the
authors add that the future preferences of human beings are one of the most important unknown
factors in the evaluation of biodiversity, and are the point at which “the option value approach
connects to the transformative value approach” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 156).
MacLaurin and Sterelny base their approach on two possibilities; the first, “that species
(or for that matter ecosystems) that are not of value to us at present may become valuable at some
later time”, and the second, that “as our knowledge improves… we will come to discover new
ways in which species can be valuable” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 154). As with
Sarkar's indirect transformative value, components of biodiversity are not being valued for their
present utility, but for the potential they may possess for future utility or in the future ability to
change our preferences for utility altogether. Economically speaking, option value could be
defined as “the additional amount a person would pay for some amenity over and above its
current value..to maintain the option of having that amenity available for the future...” (van
Kooten and Bulte 2000, as taken from MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 154).
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The sort of “bet-hedging” and precautionary arguments put forth by Sarkar and
MacLaurin and Sterelny seem viable when considering the adequacy conditions to be used in this
analysis. As MacLaurin and Sterelny admit, “the crucial point about option value is that it makes
diversity valuable” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008, pp. 154). In other words, this ethic may
simply be constructed because it satisfies certain adequacy conditions, notably the generality
condition, effectively. Indeed, it is clear that the generality condition is met, not to mention the
collectivity condition, as no currently-known utility of any species or phenomena is required. The
all-taxa condition is a bit harder to apply, though again it is not unthinkable that option value
could be applied to higher taxonomic classes. The moral force argument is largely satisfied by the
anthropocentric focus of the ethic. In fact, the only conditions on which these ethics seem to fall
short are the non-anthropocentric and the comprehensibility condition. It is clear that the ethic is
anthropocentric, and thus would not satisfy the first of these two conditions. Second, the logic
behind its development, though in many ways quite sound, may well be outside the grasp of a
large portion of the human population, or else so complex that it could not adequately be applied
in practical, day-to-day situations in which little time for deliberation is permitted. Furthermore,
educating the public on such an ethic would be highly problematic and time-consuming.
While the concept of a precautionary ethic seems initially straightforward, it is easy to
become mired in the conceptual twists and turns employed by proponents of precautionary ethics
in the effort to overcome logical opposition like the directionality problem. Thus, if precautionary
ethics were to be taught in an environmental education format, they would either need to ignore
glaring issues like the directionality problem altogether, or include excessive explanation and
reasoning in order to prove the somewhat convoluted logic reinforcing such an ethic.
Furthermore, additional criticisms to these ethics exist which draw attention to their
potential failings. MacLaurin and Sterelny address a substantial problem with the idea put forth
by Eliot Sober in his work “Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism”. This “ubiquity
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problem”, according to Elliot Sober, lies in the fact that option value seems to be “turning
ignorance of value into reason for action” (Sober, 1986, as taken from MacLaurin and Sterelny,
2005, pp. 156).
Amongst his varied criticisms of common environmental arguments, Eliot Sober (1986)
addresses transformative value and other precautionary arguments with a critical focus. As
mentioned earlier, Sober's powerful objection to the use of precautionary ethics is that a logical
“jump” is made from a position of ignorance or uncertainty to a point at which a decision is
made. Ignorance, Sober rather rationally argues, is not reason for action. In his words, “If we
literally do not know what consequences the extinction of this or that species may bring, then we
should take seriously the possibility that the extinction may be beneficial as well as the possibility
that it may be deleterious”(Sober, 1986, as taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 176). In
other words, the mere uncertainty of an outcome associated with a particular action does not
present justification for action. The logic of this criticism forces proponents of precautionary
ethics to take a step back and temper the claims of this point of view.
MacLaurin and Sterelny's response to Sober's problem is that some knowledge should be
gathered for option valuation; in other words, we “need to be knowledgeable enough to ignore
very remote possibilities” and be “ignorant, but not too ignorant” (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2008,
pp. 156). This “partial ignorance”, they argue, is what makes option value work; conservation
scientists can place value on a large number of aspects of biodiversity based on limited (but
convincing) knowledge of the sciences without having to place value on positively anything and
everything that might possibly have value at some point in time. The emphasis of this ethic is thus
on probabilities, meaning circumstances which, according to our knowledge, are likely (or
probable) to occur, as opposed to possibilities which are any circumstances which might possibly
occur. It is evident that there must be some cutoff, then, at which the value of a species (or the
circumstances or preferences leading such value) becomes probable rather than simply possible.
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Naturally, this would be when current research points in this direction more strongly than
knowledge to the contrary. This hypothetical “cutoff probability” may thus lie just above a halfand-half chance. If human beings are surer that benefits will come from valuing a species than
they are that harm will come from it, it makes logical sense to attribute some value therein. How
much value, for that matter, may simply depend on how convinced human beings are of the
potential benefits versus the potential costs.
It should be noted that this version of a precautionary ethic is not equivalent to the sort of
probability-to-value calculations by which demand values of uncertain outcomes are determined,
for instance, those in which a 50% chance of gaining $100 is valued at $50. If the probabilities of
certain beneficial effects of species conservation were known, there would be no issue regarding
the evaluation of species. In the case of option value, no real probability is known; the uncertainty
still exists, but certain indications, logical or intuitive, suggest that a desirable outcome is more
probably than an undesirable one. I, for one, would hesitate to blame the ethicist who encouraged
the conservation of great whales even if in centuries to come great whales were the cause of some
great human catastrophe. The undesirable effect of conservation in such a case seems unlikely,
and thus the potential benefits outweigh these costs.
While this amendment to the option value option eliminates a good deal of its logical
issues, it should be noted that it causes precautionary ethics to lose a key advantage over demand
values; the satisfaction of the collectivity condition. Though they have maintained the satisfaction
of the prioritization condition and have been made more convincing and logically sound,
precautionary ethics lose out on inclusiveness. Because value can only be attributed to biological
phenomena that human beings believe will have some value or the potential to change
preferences in the future, certain hypothetical species, especially those about which humans are
particularly ignorant, are not attributed value. Thus, precautionary ethics, not unlike demand
value ethics, sacrifice some inclusiveness for practicality and logical soundness. In contrast to
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demand value ethics, precautionary ethics are substantially more inclusive, which is reasonable.
A major disadvantage, however, as mentioned earlier, is that precautionary ethics are difficult to
conceptualize and, given more recent modifications regarding probable circumstances, require
substantial research to be effective.

II.6 Further Ethical Considerations for Conservation
Having addressed the three main categories of biodiversity evaluation—intrinsic,
demand, and precautionary—and their respective advantages and disadvantages, it makes sense to
discuss additional considerations for a biodiversity ethic that do not necessarily fall into any of
these three specific categories.
In his essay “Philosophical Problems for Environmentalism”, Eliot Sober (1986) reveals
a powerful concern for biodiversity ethics while relating a common ethical argument for intrinsic
biodiversity ethics to arguments regarding abortion. What Sober calls “slippery slope” arguments
state that, because no line can be drawn in situations of “degree” (like species extinction) where
many increments stand between one state and another, each increment must be given the value or
priority of the entire state change to prevent the change from occurring, or else they may simply
encourage the mindset that they have no value at all. With regard to environmentalism, Sober
explains that “if it is the wholesale impoverishment of the biosphere that matters, one would
apparently have to concede that each extinction matters a little, but only a little...” but if species
are valued this way, people may be “inviting the wholesale impoverishment that would be an
unambiguous disaster” (Sober, 1986, as taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 177). Thus,
with these arguments in mind, allowing the extinction of a single species permits the extinction of
the next, and so on, thus eventually leading to the catastrophic results of ecosystem failure.
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Sober likens this mindset to arguments used in the abortion debate; interestingly enough,
ones which serve both sides. Anti-abortionists, for example, argue that because infanticide is
considered extremely unethical, and no distinct line can be drawn between a fertilized egg and a
9-month old where it is or is not considered as valuable as an infant or newborn, abortion at any
age must be equally unethical. Thus, it must be unethical to kill a zygote at any stage of
development in order to prevent the sort of thinking that permits infanticide. At the same time,
such arguments are used to justify abortion, with the logic that because it is permissible to abort a
zygote or a fertilized egg, and no clear defining line can be drawn between that egg and a fetus at
advanced stages of development, abortion should be permissible at any age.
Both of these “slippery slope” arguments, as explained by Sober, rely on the fact that
there is “no place to draw the line”, but, he argues, “the fact that you cannot draw a line does not
force you to say that two alleged categories collapse into one” (Sober, 1986, as taken from
Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 178). Sober thus argues that situations of degree (including
abortion, species extinction, and the loss of other biological phenomena) require a different way
of thinking. Regarding species loss, Sober explains that “Since the biological differences are ones
of degree, not kind, one may want to adopt the position that the moral differences are likewise
matters of degree” (Sober, 1986, as taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 178). In this
regard, while it can be granted that all species (and other components of biodiversity) have some
value, this value increases with their rarity; as more and more species go extinct from human
action, greater and greater justification will be needed to warrant further human-caused
extinctions. According to Sober, “This means that one can value diversity without being obliged
to take the somewhat exaggerated position that each species [or component of biodiversity], no
matter how many there are, is terribly precious in virtue of its contribution to that diversity”
(Sober, 1986, as taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 179).
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This sort of thinking eventually leads to the framework of a separate environmentalist
ethic, one which may apply quite well to biodiversity conservation. Sober's aesthetic ethic is
explained through a comparison of biological phenomena to works of art and the way we value
them. As Sober explains, “our attachments are to objects and people as they really are, not just to
the experiences they facilitate” (Sober, 1986, as taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 189).
In terms of art and biological phenomena, this means that what people value in these things is not
simply their instrumental value as a provider of certain experiences, but in some actual
connection humans make with those phenomena. This sort of thinking forms a new justification
for a sort of intrinsic value ethic based on aesthetics. Though it seems almost intrinsic, it should
be noted that this sort of value is not independent of the “valuer”; while some concept of an
object or concept’s connection to a human being (it’s “genuineness”) is being valued, the
connection being valued cannot exist unless both the object and the “valuer” exist.
Continuing to draw parallels between components of biodiversity and artwork, Sober also
asserts that an aesthetic evaluation would promote the evaluation of higher organizational levels
of biodiversity including ecosystems and larger taxonomic classes. He introduces the idea that
works of art are valued not just in substance but in context. Just as a work of art is valued more in
its original setting, an endangered species would be additionally valued in the context of its
habitat. As Sober explains, “This leads to the more holistic position that preserving ecosystems,
and not simply preserving certain member species, is of primary importance” (Sober, 1986, as
taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 189). By this logic, aesthetic value can be attributed to
all organizational levels of biological phenomena, thus satisfying the collectivity adequacy
condition.
Sober next addresses his earlier ideas with regard to matters of degree, explaining that in
a system of aesthetic value, rarity is also an important quality. By this logic, “A work of art may
have enhanced value simply because there are very few other works by the same artist,” (Sober,
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1986, as taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 190), and subsequently, when “viewed as
aesthetic objects, rare organisms may be valuable because they are rare” (Sober, 1986, as taken
from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 189). In this way, Sober's aesthetic ethic makes use of his
earlier assertion regarding matters of degree, and thus resolves the problem of using “slippery
slope” arguments, which often reduce the value of biodiversity to either purely intrinsic or purely
instrumental, and opens an avenue for species prioritization based on their rarity.
Focusing more keenly on the adequacy conditions outlined at the beginning of this
section, it is evident that Sober's aesthetic value ethic is indeed a successful candidate as a
conservation ethic. The generality condition is satisfied, because aesthetic appreciation has no
real limit to what exactly can be valued. The only constraints on the inclusivity of this ethic
would be in the aesthetic desires of those who hold it; naturally it would be desirable that through
environmental education human beings find all biological phenomena aesthetically valuable. It is
thus conceivable that all components of biodiversity outlined earlier could be valued in this sense.
The collectivity condition is also thoroughly satisfied, because as Eliot explained, often what is
aesthetically valuable about pieces of art is their context, and thus the surrounding phenomena of
larger organizational levels are also to be valued as related to certain especially valued
phenomena. In this regard, the entire ecosystem and community understood to relate to a specific
endangered species would be given equivalent or near-equivalent value to the species itself. At
the same time, the individuals that make up that species would also be valued. In this way, the
aesthetic value ethic serves to attribute value to all organizational levels, not simply species or
individuals. The all-taxa condition is initially concerning, as human beings clearly tend to place
more value on the aesthetics of charismatic species, but, as Sober explains, what is truly valued is
the object (or phenomenon), and not the experience it gives. Therefore, as with works of art that
are not necessarily “charismatic”, aesthetic value is attributable. As mentioned earlier, the
priority-setting condition is satisfied by the evaluation of rarity in the aesthetic value ethic, which
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necessitates increasingly great justification for allowing a phenomenon to become “extinct” as it
becomes rarer.
The ethic fails the “non-anthropocentrism” adequacy condition, though, given its minimal
importance, this is a negligible shortcoming. The aesthetic value ethic encounters the majority of
its problems when confronted with the comprehensibility condition, and for a number of reasons.
From the very beginning, its name may pose a problem, suggesting at first that a sort of hollow
valuation of species simply as objects of viewing pleasure. This sort of misinterpretation creates
the sort of reflexive opposition aesthetic value ethics commonly encounter from the rest of the
environmental community. Sober hypothesizes that environmentalists may “feel that aesthetic
concerns are frivolous” or “antithetical to a proper regard for the wilderness” (Sober, 1986, as
taken from Schmidz and Willott, 2002, pp. 191), and though he assures readers that such
responses are unfounded, their prominence as an immediate reaction remains. In this way,
without additional explanation and analysis, this ethic loses much of its intuitive pull.

II.7 Is there no “Just Right”?
The preceding review of ethical values ascribed to various components of biodiversity
should provide the reader with a thorough and organized account of the sort of options available
to conservationists in justifying their efforts and the respective advantages and disadvantages
involved with each. It is evident that no “one ethic” has been constructed which flawlessly
accomplishes all the goals of a conservation ethic while additionally satisfying conditions of
adequacy and rational criticism. Instead of one grand or universal solution, conservationists are
faced with a set of ethical tools which are appropriate for separate contexts and appeal to different
interest groups.
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Intrinsic value ethics are perhaps the easiest to understand of common conservation
ethics, with almost spiritual implications regarding morality and obligations toward other forms
of life. The intuitive appeal of these arguments makes them practical for application in “grassroots” movements and in non-legal sectors of conservation. A lack of purely rational justification
and prioritization makes these somewhat cruder ethics difficult for the implementation of
conservation legislation and largely unconvincing to cynical or self-interested individuals.
Demand-value ethics or anthropocentric ethics tend to be the most practical and
commonly cited, with strong intuitive pull and logical soundness. Their main weakness lies in the
uncertainty in scientific knowledge regarding biodiversity and the ways it benefits human beings,
particularly regarding the diversity-stability hypothesis. Demand-value ethics are easy to
understand and difficult to argue against, though they may fall short in attributing value to all
aspects of biodiversity. A distinct reliance on scientific research is a key hindrance to these ethics,
and one upon which their future success will depend.
Precautionary ethics have some reasonable intuitive appeal and escape the weaknesses of
demand value ethics with their reliance on complete information and research. These ethics
bridge the gap between the satisfaction of human interests and the uncertainty involved with the
benefits of certain components of biodiversity to the rest of the biosphere. In the process,
however, they expose new vulnerabilities, including problems of directionality. Additionally,
precautionary ethics may be particularly difficult to conceptualize and may be inaccessible to
uneducated individuals or those who must make conservation decisions within a limited amount
of time or with limited available information. For this reason, such ethics may be inappropriate
for some educational purposes and for encouragement of environmental stewardship in societies
with poor education systems.

71

An aesthetic value ethic avoids claims of instrumental value to human beings and instead
values a sort of “connection” between human beings and the authentic objects that they value.
Aesthetic value also eliminates the reliance on the heavily disputed diversity-stability hypothesis
and avoids the directionality issues of precautionary arguments. Such an ethic provides a rational
explanation for why rare species, though possibly less influential on their environment, should
still be preserved. In so doing, aesthetic value ethics satisfy the generality and all-taxa conditions,
and with the additional necessity to conserve “context” as well as the object of value, also satisfy
the collectivity condition. The moral force condition, by contrast, may not be satisfied, as many
human beings see aesthetic interests as frivolous or unimportant. Additionally, such ethics may
not distinguish the value of components of biodiversity above cultural artifacts, which could pose
substantial obstacles for conservation.
Thus, amidst the sometimes overwhelming wealth of ethics available to the
conservationist, it seems there is no particular ethic that is “just right”. Though I will not deny the
possibility that such an understanding or relationship with the natural world exists which might
form a perfect ethic, I will assert that this “perfect ethic” has yet to be found. For this reason, as
mentioned earlier, the utility in the preceding analysis is not in a “ranking” of the best to the
worst available ethics, but to highlight the particular strengths and weaknesses of each. With this
information, a given ethic may be more effectively applied to a context in which it is particularly
effective or useful.
II.8 A Pluralist Conservation Ethic
The ethical approach which arises from this perspective on biodiversity ethics is certainly
a pluralist one; to consider a variety of ethics appropriate for a variety of contexts, one must
concede that there is no overriding “master ethic” which governs them all. According to Andrew
Light (2003), a “master ethic” is not feasible in an environmental ethic “either (1) theoretically,
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because the sources of value in nature are too diverse to account for in any single value theory or
(2), practically, because an environmental ethics sufficient to motivate enough people to extend
moral consideration to the nonhuman natural world would have to appeal to a broader range of
intuitions about the value of nature than is found in the work of any single approach to
environmental ethics” (Light, 2003). My adherence to a pluralist ethic is motivated by the latter
reasoning. While I do not necessarily believe that no “master ethic” exists or can exist, I do
believe that human knowledge of natural systems is insufficient to create such an ethic. For that
reason, not unlike my approach to a similar problem in part I, I propose a “next-best-thing”
approach with the interest of finding a workable solution to a problem in which time is of the
essence. Thus, I make the case here for a “practical pluralist” perspective on biodiversity ethics,
not denying that some great “divine ethic” may exist, but taking the responsibly humble and
cautious stance that the human race may yet to have discovered such an ethic. As Andrew Light
put it, “we literally do not have the time to await agreement all the way down,” (Light, 2003);
ethical systems are needed now to provide a rational framework for conservation, and it is clear
that certain ethics fit some situations better than others.
Thus, “as long as our different moral frameworks are oriented toward the same
environmental priorities, we can ignore for the time being many of the issues of the truth about
which reason for valuing nature is actually right” (Light, 2003). As explained in the beginning of
this section, it was never my intention to label one ethic as right and another as wrong; it is
instead to propose a practically effective ethic involving a mixture of the preceding perspectives.
Naturally, this strongly pluralist perspective is not without its opposition. There is considerable
controversy in philosophy between monist and pluralist perspectives, and in the final paragraphs
of this section I will briefly defend this pluralist perspective as it relates to the application of
conservation ethics.
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J. Baird Callicott (2003) takes a formidable stand against pluralist ethics which is well
worth mentioning in this section. Attacking the customary definition of pluralism, which explains
that an agent may shift from one set of ethics to another where certain ethics are more
appropriate, Callicott explains that such thinking leads to a sort of “moral promiscuity” in which
an agent will simply employ whatever ethic “gets the job done”. Such “moral promiscuity” could
conceivably lead to the justification of horrible acts (Callicott, 2003).
Andrew Light’s response to this objection is one regarding specifics. While pluralism in
its purest form may indeed create the possibility of moral pluralism, practical pluralism, by
contrast, employs pluralism only by necessity and not as a standard; it thus acknowledges the
superiority of a “master ethic” if such a thing were to exist, but makes do in its absence. As Light
puts it, “the practical pluralist does not necessarily advocate the need for a single agent to shift
from one moral theory to another based on the relationship at hand, but rather encourages the
articulation of a diversity of moral arguments for the same end” (Light, 2003, pp. 236). It is
evident that the practical pluralist employs a pluralist perspective cautiously; such is the approach
with my suggestion of a pluralist biodiversity ethic. Especially with the overwhelming consensus
in favor of some form of biodiversity conservation, I am confident that the use of a pluralist ethic
will not lead to the justification of deplorable action. This is not to say that a pluralist approach
does not have its problems.
The most prominent stumbling-block of any pluralist ethic is the idea of “contradictory
indications”. Naturally, if ethics are different, in certain situations they may differ in what sort of
action they prescribe. In a biodiversity conservation context, the use of multiple ethics may
conceivably create several different courses of action regarding a single set of circumstances. For
example, assume that the only population of a certain distinct subspecies of jewelweed lived in
the same meadow in which a children’s hospital was to be built. Option-value thinkers would
suppose that the value of saving hundreds of youngsters from injury and disease would outweigh
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the potential genetic value held in a rare subspecies of an otherwise fairly common plant, while
intrinsic value thinkers may have a more complicated situation weighing one form of life against
the other. Demand value conservationists, by contrast, would have little predicament at all. Thus,
which ethic, if any, is to be given priority, and how will such conflicts be resolved? As Callicott
explains, “attempting to act upon inconsistent or mutually contradictory ethical principles results
in frustration of action altogether or in actions that are either incoherent or mutually cancelling”
(Callicott, 2003, pp. 208). It is clear from this line of thinking that inconsistencies pose a threat to
the viability of pluralist ethics.
Referring once more to the overwhelming consensus regarding biodiversity conservation,
I first make the simple argument that such cases of blatant disagreement will be for the most part
rare, and certainly not impossible to resolve through legal mediation. After all, conflicts of
interests are an everyday part of the real world which policymakers and activists alike continually
encounter. The possibility of conflict and argumentation has been present in all political and
ethical systems; to forbid or intentionally prevent such issues would bear great resemblance to a
dictatorship.
Conceding still that a consistent system for conflict settlement is necessary, I believe
that—until a more universally applicable conservation ethic is found—ethical decisions within
this pluralist framework should be settled as similar decisions are today: by the government or
courts. More specifically, because I have suggested that particular ethics are especially
appropriate for certain contexts, I assert that ethical decisions made within these contexts should
be bound by those ethics, and each “context” should have use of whatever authority is normally
vested in it. Because precautionary and demand value ethics are apparently the most logically
sound and practically applicable methods of evaluation, it makes sense that they be put to use in
governments, and thus that government action in conservation be according to such ethics. By
contrast, intrinsic value or aesthetic value ethics, far less appropriate for policymaking but more
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intuitively appealing and easy to understand, are better employed in environmental education and
on cultural grounds, especially for those who lack the philosophical and statistical training to
make complex assessments involved with precautionary ethics. This sort of attitude toward
intrinsic evaluation of natural phenomena is often congruous with a respect for native cultural or
religious views necessary for positive interaction.
Following the way most societies are organized today, precautionary ethics would thus
have some priority, as government powers are generally responsible for policymaking, though the
larger public, likely more disposed to intrinsic value ethics, would have the ability to contest
decisions and influence policy. Thus, my idea for a pluralist ethic is to have ethics employed
where they are most fit, and then allow decisions to be made the way they are in similar ethical
debates where disagreements arise.
In this way, I propose here the use of a pluralist biodiversity ethic with the intention of
providing well-rounded justification for conservation management and providing an ethical
framework for the great diversity of ethical relationships humans have with an even greater
diversity of biological phenomena. This approach is not intended to be an end-all solution to
biodiversity ethics, but a step in the right direction, a best possible approach to utilize until
something more fitting is available. As with other issues in conservation biology, human beings
do not necessarily have the time to await theoretical perfection before acting to save biological
variety. Instead, like with our growing definition of biodiversity, adaptive management must be
guided by adaptive ethical frameworks.
The perspectives formed in the preceding two sections are again largely meaningless
without application to real-world conservation situations. As is often said, conservation biology is
a “science of necessity”, and thus values practical application as much as theoretical

76

understanding. In the third and final section of this text, the real-world implications of earlier
theoretical arguments will be explained and suggested for application in conservation biology.

Section III: How to Preserve Biodiversity?

III.1 Applying Theory under Uncertainty
While theoretical challenges like defining biodiversity and justifying its conservation are
integral parts of any effort to conserve natural phenomena, such answers—difficult as they are to
attain—are not enough to resolve issues of global conservation. Naturally, practical issues—from
planning to application—must also come into play if philosophical and ethical understanding will
be put into practice. As Bryan Norton put it, “the problem is that the brilliant theoretical insights
of Leopold have proven frightfully difficult to operationalize” (Norton, 2003, pp. 114). From a
practical standpoint, no amount of correct thinking and logical or spiritual acumen will manifest
actual change unless properly applied. In regard to the previous two sections of this work, the
words of Bruce Lee come to mind: “Knowing is not enough, one must apply. Willing is not
enough, one must do.”
Thus, though I have already provided a tentative outline for defining biodiversity and a
practical-pluralist ethic to clarify the necessity and target(s) of conservation, a great “how” clause
is left unanswered, and it follows that discussion should shift to how best to manifest this
understanding in conservation measures in the future. Even if the justification of biodiversity
conservation is not agreed upon, the general consensus remains in favor of conservation. As a
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“science of necessity”, “the protection of biological diversity must proceed” even “amidst
considerable uncertainty” (Norton, 2003, pp. 126).
The third and final section of this work focuses on evaluating the conservation practices
in use today and presenting suggestions based both on the concepts of the first two sections and
on the work of other authors. Needless to say, the full range of conservation measures and
practices employed worldwide is an enormous and varied study subject. To narrow the scope of
analysis to a level appropriate for this work, a single case study will be employed as a focal point
for criticism and an exemplar for future projects.

III.2 The Republic of Costa Rica: A Case Study in Conservation
The Republic of Costa Rica, a country with no military and an economy based largely on
ecotourism, has a reputation as an environmental leader; it is ranked 3rd in the world by the 2010
Environmental Performance Index for its efforts to conserve its astounding natural heritage (Yale
Center for Environmental Law & Policy 2010). Often considered the “greenest country in the
world”, Costa Rica makes good use of the wealth of biological phenomena in a territory roughly
the size of Virginia, with income from ecotourism exceeding that of all exports combined since
the late 1990's (ICT 2006). By 1999, revenue from tourism composed 9% of the nation's GDP,
about $950 million. In its tiny landmass, Costa Rica is thought to contain about 5% of the world's
known species, with at least 500,000 identified species (INBio Website, 2010). In addition, over
25% of the national territory falls under some form of legal protection for conservation purposes
(INBio Website, 2010). Costa Rica makes an ideal case study for an investigation of conservation
policy and action, referred to “as an example of a country that has wholeheartedly embraced
sustainable development with protected areas as the centerpiece” (Brandon, 2004, pp. 299).
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Indeed, the country has shown a long-standing commitment to environmental and
conservation issues, evident in the myriad laws and government agencies it has devoted to such
purposes. In fact, the environment is included in the constitutional rights of its citizens (Salazar,
2004). The constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica lists amongst its priorities conservation and
the protection of natural beauty, and grants all its citizens a right to “a healthy and ecologically
balanced environment,” (GOCR 1984). In a more recent amendment, this statement asserts that
“Every person has the right to a healthy and ecologically balanced environment. Therefore, he or
she is justified in denouncing any act that infringes upon that right and claiming reparations for
the damage caused” (GOCR 1994).
Over the last 30 years, the government of Costa Rica has also delegated environmental
responsibility to a variety of organizations created often exclusively to address conservation
issues. For example, in 1978 the National Parks Foundation was created, a group dedicated to the
management, protection, and planning of the country's many national parks. Eight years later, the
government designated a ministry intended to bring conservation policy to equal status with
extractive policy (forestry, mining, agriculture, etc.), which brought these policy decisions to a
single organization. MINAE (The Ministry of Environment and Energy), as it was called, worked
to solve a problem common to most Latin American countries stemming from inconsistent
government policy and low prioritization of environmental issues (Brandon, 2004; Rudel and
Roper 1996, 1997). Over the next three years, SINAC (The National System of Conservation
Areas) was established as a conservation-focused subset of MINAE, and INBio (National
Biodiversity Institute) was formed to create a central authority to inventory the country's
abundant biodiversity (Brandon, 2004). A more recent program started in 1996 established a
number of market-based mechanisms encouraging conservation, including the elimination of
subsidies toward activities which degraded the environment, and direction of revenue flow from
users to providers of environmental services. In this way, the owner of a private reserve
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containing a mangrove ecosystem which improves water quality might receive payments taken
from environmental taxes paid by a corporation which regularly deposits wastes in the same
aquatic systems (Brandon, 2004). With such powerful legislation supporting environmental
sustainability, and a multitude of ministries and organizations devoted to the conservation of
biological phenomena, it is clear why Costa Rica might be lauded as an exemplary “green
nation”. Predictably, though, and like any other country, Costa Rica has its problems, making it
clear that even a country with this level of environmental commitment still has much room for
improvement.
Given the prescriptive purpose of this section, greater emphasis will be placed on the
environmental and conservation-related problems in Costa Rica than on its accomplishments. I
would like to emphasize, however, that these shortcomings are not unique to Costa Rica and that
they in no way belittle its respectable efforts toward biodiversity conservation and sustainability.
Much can be learned from the successes and stumbling blocks of various conservation initiatives
undertaken in Costa Rica over the last few decades, but the country’s massive accomplishments
in conservation are far from negligible.
Perhaps the greatest problem with Costa Rica's seemingly unmatched commitment to
conservation is summed up in a quote from the Ministers of the Environment World Forum
(2000), which states that “there is an alarming discrepancy between commitments and action.”
Though the strength of legislation described earlier seems absolute, it must be understood that,
like any abstract idea, a law has no effect unless accurately followed; therein lies a large issue for
Costa Rica. As Roxana Salazar (2004) eloquently explains, “In Costa Rica, environmental
destruction is, at least in part, the product of poor interpretation and lack of enforcement of the
laws, as well as the shortcomings in the laws and public policies themselves” (Salazar, 2004, pp.
281). Indeed, most critics of Costa Rica's environmental efforts cite poor implementation of
admittedly aggressive and generally solid policy (Brandon, 2004). These critics and observers of
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the country’s environmental policy cite one issue with overwhelming unanimity: enforcement.
“The most serious problems lie in enforcement,” explains Salazar, adding that various judicial
boards all-too-often approve funding for projects which are detrimental to the surrounding
environment (Salazar, 2004, pp. 282). Enforcement, says Salazar, is “hindered by a deficiency of
clear policies, inadequate budgets and human resources, and lack of follow-up evaluation and
verification mechanisms” (Salazar, 2004, pp. 281). The scientific ignorance of legal officials and
local staff are also commonly bemoaned inhibitors to the proper implementation of Costa Rica's
impressive policies (Bustos, 2004; Quesada & Stoner, 2004; Salazar, 2004).
Though it is clear that regulations are not being adequately implemented, the policies
themselves are not without their shortcomings. According to Julio Alberto Bustos (2004), the
government's tendency to pass green laws with little thought or consideration leads to an
overabundance of conflicting and overlapping legislation which often muddles environmental
issues beyond recognition (Bustos, 2004). In this way, issues can rarely be clearly resolved and
questions of environmental and ethical justice are left largely unanswered. A statistic provided by
MINAE states that, despite attempts at legal enforcement, amidst this tangle of legislation and
weak enforcement more than 25% of all commercial wood harvested in Costa Rica is illegal.
Bustos explains that the overwhelming impunity of violators of environmental law is due to the
complex web of environmental organizations and officers (MINAE, the Office of the
environmental Comptroller, the environmental Tribunal, the Environmental Prosecutor, etc.)
through which information must be passed to bring criminals to justice. Communication and
power distribution between these various parties is patchy and inconsistent, resulting in an
overcomplicated and often ineffective legal system.
Environmental criminals, then, due either to apathy, ignorance, lack of enforcement or
discombobulated judicial processes, go largely unpunished for their acts. This concept was clearly
illustrated to me during my stay in Costa Rica, where streams running into the ocean from a
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banana plantation nearly five miles away often ran a slight silvery-blue with fertilizers and
pesticides, and where a local man told me without hesitation that he regularly poached eggs of the
endangered Hawksbill sea turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) while helping his best friend—an
employee for a local sea turtle conservation project—put up posters discouraging the
consumption of turtle eggs.
Among the myriad problems arising from the poor enforcement and the structure of
Costa Rica's environmental policies, even ecotourism, usually reputed as the ultimate, mutuallybeneficial environmental solution combining economic and environmental benefit, causes
immense problems for conservation. In the case of the endangered sea turtle populations who rely
on Costa Rica's two coasts for nesting grounds, ecotourism has become an enormous problem.
Due to the incredible growth of the tourist industry, land development in Costa Rica increased by
600% from 1998 to 2008, and with a lack of proper infrastructure, 97% of sewage from these new
developments runs untreated into rivers, streams, and eventually the ocean (Sherwood, 2008).
Resulting algal blooms smother offshore coral reefs and the incredible biodiversity they support,
not to mention the source of revenue which brought tourist operations there in the first place. At
the same time, sea turtle nesting sites are constricted by rising storm surges and sea level due to
global climate change and the gradual descent of tourist developments further and further onto
Costa Rica's beaches. With shrunken nesting sites and high illegal poaching rates, the Pacific
population of the endangered leatherback sea turtle (Dermochelys coriacea) has declined more
than 97% since 1988 (Rosenthal, 2009).
The issue for ecotourism in Costa Rica appears to be not simply in practice but in
mindset. Ecotourist enterprises have allowed the environment to be used in an exploitative
fashion when they were intended to protect it. Many authors cite the increasing number of luxury
resorts dotting the Pacific coast, which provide everything from swimming pools to golf courses
for alleged ecotourists (Rosenthall, 2009; Sherwood, 2008,). Considering the ethical issues
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reviewed earlier in this book, it appears that demand-value ethics involved with ecotourism
become harmful and exploitative when not tempered by a solid understanding of ecological
principles and scientific research. What was originally intended to connect economic and
environmental wellbeing has instead resulted in large-scale ecological degradation. As illustrated
by the majestic and gigantic leatherbacks, when ecotourism runs unchecked, it destroys the very
phenomena on which it thrives.
The troubling contrast between Costa Rica's reputation and actual condition have lead to
substantial efforts toward rectifying the situation and conserving the biodiversity that is still so
heavily threatened. For the last two decades, countless authors and researchers have been
addressing the problem and putting forth their own suggestions based on varying experiences
with conservation work. I will summarize a generalized list of suggestions for biodiversity
conservation initiatives from the work of these authors and allow this to broaden to more
universal guidelines as this section continues.

III.3 Data Collection and Inventorying
Paul Hanson (2004) explains that the first shortcomings in biodiversity conservation
efforts arise in the collection of scientific data used in designation and assessment of conservation
areas. Non-inclusive and biased inventories skew results and can “short-change” regions of the
real value of their biological phenomena. If conservation decisions are being made upon false
data, they are simply not fulfilling their purpose. As Hanson explains, “inventorying and
monitoring have involved organisms that are relatively well-known—taxonomically—for
example, vertebrates and vascular plants. Yet the poorly known groups of organisms... constitute
the majority of the species” (Hanson, 2004, pp. 299). According to some researchers, it is these
“taxonomically difficult” and generally less heavily studied groups—like insects, fungi,
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microbes, and some plants—that are often better indicators of environmental change (Hanson,
2004).
Hanson bemoans the decreased importance attributed to taxonomic research in developed
countries, notable in the decreasing entrance of graduate students into such fields of study and
funding cuts to natural history museums. Biological collections, he argues, are “every bit as
valuable as their more dazzling counterparts in nuclear physics facilities,” (Hanson, 2004, pp.
299), in that they, too, hold potential value in the untold secrets they contain—an argument
strongly based in the precautionary ethics explained in the previous section. This value, Hanson
explains, is further increased in the field of conservation biology, where accurate assays of
biodiversity (in this context, measured simply by abundance of species) are invaluable for
conservation decisions.
INBio, Costa Rica's institute dedicated to biodiversity inventories, sets a good example
for future conservation programs in other countries in both its successes and failures. Hanson
(2004) reviews the methods employed by the various INBio research centers in Costa Rica and
presents suggestions for their improvement. The institution is focused on cataloguing as many of
the species present in Costa Rica as possible, and thus abides by a very narrow, almost traditional
definition of Biodiversity—that is, as defined only by a species count. The chief mechanism by
which surveys are carried out is through the work of “parataxonomists”, local people from
villages adjacent to protected areas that are trained in data and specimen collection. The
specimens brought in by parataxonomists are then identified, classified, and catalogued by trained
technicians (Hanson, 2004; Janzen et al, 1993). Apparently, the method of employing local
parataxonomists is very productive, and enabled INBio to collect massive amounts of data. As
Hanson explains, “the team of parataxonomists in Guanacaste Conservation Area have produced
more specimen-based information on host ranges of parasitoids than was previously known from
all of tropical America” (Hanson, 2004, pp. 231).
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While this form of data collection does enable rapid sampling on a large scale, it does
have its shortcomings. Certain species are difficult to acquire or are particularly rare in certain
areas and thus often not collected. In other cases, overzealous collecting can yield to
oversampling of more common and easily acquired species. Even after specimens are acquired, it
is often incredibly difficult to identify them accurately (even if the species has a name—many are
yet nameless) without assistance from experts. All technicians and taxonomists in INBio research
centers are either experts from foreign universities or trained by them. In this way, the programs
rely heavily on training form outside professionals for expertise and do not have a large enough
knowledge base to run independently. Naturally, this creates a huge demand for trained personnel
and the money to afford further training and employment of trained personnel, not to mention
access to scientific literature which might contribute to the feeble knowledge base (Hanson,
2004).
Beyond issues with staff, INBio experiences more concrete limitations on its biodiversity
inventories. For example, Costa Rican law only requires that trees and vertebrates be included in
environmental impact studies (Hanson, 2004). It is understandable how such a narrow scope
might limit biodiversity assays, especially when around 300,000 of Costa Rica's 500,000 named
species are thought to be insects (INBio website, 2010). Additionally, inventories are only carried
out in national parks and protected areas, but not in private reserves and private property not set
aside for conservation (Hanson, 2004; Herzog and Vaughan, 1998). This sort of inventorying
gives a “patchy” and incomplete look at the country's biodiversity, and would fail to detect
potential hotspots for conservation if they existed on property not currently being protected. From
the standpoint of this paper, it is clear that even if expanded to include all taxa, the INBio
approach to biodiversity inventories may still be too narrow a perspective. To provide an accurate
and clear assessment of valuable biological phenomena, many more components must be studied,
including behavior, disparity, community composition and entire ecosystems.
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Even if INBio is forming an accurate portrayal of Costa Rica's biodiversity, Hanson
argues that their discoveries are not adequately publicized. As Hanson explains, “the information
obtained from inventories has to be made available for a variety of uses, notably scientific
advancement, environmental education, and conservation management,” (Hanson, 2004, pp. 234).
Though publications are produced, they are poorly distributed and do not effectively reach
policymakers and conservation biologists in a reasonable timeframe. Needless to say, if
information so painstakingly collected cannot be put to use for its intended purpose, further
efforts at accurate data collection are useless.
It is clear that inventories are a crucial part of the conservation process. Without an
accurate idea of what biodiversity is found and in what locations, human beings would be
helpless to conserve components of biodiversity in situ. As the most widely practiced and
practical method of data collection available, biodiversity inventories are certainly a critical part
of any conservation plan. As Hanson explains, “the urgency of the current situation requires us to
select areas that need protection on the basis of existing information and rapid biodiversity
assessments” (Hanson, 2004, pp. 233). Biodiversity inventories are still the most efficient way to
obtain such information. However, the accuracy of biodiversity inventories today leaves much to
be desired. Most inventories are based only on species counts and occasionally classification of
ecosystems. With regard to the definition of biodiversity established earlier, such criteria are
understandably too narrow. While it is not unthinkable that surrogates and indicators for
biodiversity may exist, inclusive assessments of biodiversity are still important and may even be
required to identify such surrogates. While the participation of local employees and volunteers is
a powerful tool, it must be reinforced with sufficient scientific knowledge and staff expertise.
Thus, funding for hiring trained professionals and providing access to scientific journals is
immensely important. Lastly, information gained from inventories must be distributed to both the
public and other targets of interest so that it can properly be put to use in policy and management.
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In addition to the suggestions presented by other authors for biodiversity inventorying, I
would also like to address the implications of part I of this work to this issue. The type of
biodiversity inventories described by Hanson—and being carried out around the world—focus
almost exclusively on a species count. The first section of this work clearly indicates that such
measurements—while they do encompass a very important part of the evolutionary process—do
not assess biodiversity in the myriad forms by which it is defined. Thus, future biodiversity
inventories should devote resources to a more inclusive study of biological systems, taking note
not only of species count but other important and valued phenomena like ecosystems and
morphological disparity.
While it is easy to criticize those who carry out modern biodiversity inventories, it is
quickly obvious that the use of species-counts for inventorying is largely a matter of practicality;
the measurement of other components of biodiversity is unclear and likely time-consuming. With
this in mind, I concede, as do other authors, that when time and resources are especially scarce,
species counts function as an acceptable—though far from ideal—surrogate. However, it will be
necessary to provide some suggestions on how to measure the additional components that I argue
should be taken into account.
Fortunately, many authors making similar arguments felt the same need to present
constructive suggestions along with their criticisms of the common definition of biodiversity.
These suggestions shall be summarized here in addition with my own. MacLaurin and Sterelny,
for instance, suggest the addition of morphological and developmental diversity to biodiversity
assessments, providing a surprising solution for the problem of quantifying such phenomena. The
concept of a “morphospace”, according to MacLaurin and Sterelny, “can represent patterns of
phenotypic evolution independently or issues of phylogeny and species richness” (MacLaurin and
Sterelny, 2005, pp. 82). A morphospace is a theoretical space which assigns individual
dimensions to specific traits or characteristics to a set of organisms (MacLaurin and Sterelny,
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2005). Each individual organism can thus be placed as a set of points or a shape within the space
based on those characteristics, enabling a quantified comparison of organisms with the
characteristics they share. MacLaurin and Sterelny hastily reject the concept of “global
morphospaces” which compare all possible organisms, explaining that comparison of organisms
which do not share certain traits would be largely ineffectual. Instead, they suggest the use of
“partial morphospaces” to compare organisms within a population or species which share a set of
common characteristics. In this way, morphospaces become a powerful analytical “tool” for
assessing qualities of morphological disparity between subspecies or other smaller subpopulations
of a larger taxonomic unit.
Some key questions regarding the use of morphospaces are left unanswered by this
explanation. For example, which characteristics of a given species or population will be used? Of
the conceivably infinite traits one could ascribe to a given organism, which are the most
appropriate? MacLaurin and Sterelny explain that developmental differences play a key role in
solving this problem. They maintain that the developmental traits of an organism provide the
“principle” which can standardize and regulate an investigation of disparity through the use of
morphospaces (MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2005). “The developmental system of lineage”, explain
MacLaurin and Sterelny, “determines those aspects of phenotype that can vary independently”
(MacLaurin and Sterelny, 2005, pp. 85) and therefore provides insight into which characteristics
deserve attention and comparison in a morphospace. With this in mind, it is clear that the
morphospace is not a perfect solution to the issue of measuring phenotypic disparity, but a tool
which, if properly used, can be of great use in this context.
Thus, by restricting the use of morphospaces to smaller taxonomic units in which
comparable characteristics and structures exist and proposing the use of developmental
differences to select targets of comparison, MacLaurin and Sterelny present what I consider a
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viable analytical system to quantify morphological and developmental variety in the natural
world.
As mentioned in part I, the potential for developmental variation in a species or
population is measured by its phenotypic plasticity. It follows that inventories of developmental
variation should focus on the phenotypic plasticity of a particular species as an independent
characteristic by which it contributes to the overall diversity of a system.
Behavioral variation, too, is an additional source of biological variety and thus a
candidate for addition to biodiversity inventories. The concept of measuring and quantifying
behaviors is one already—and rather thoroughly—addressed by the field of animal behavior.
Observational techniques employed in this field prove more than sufficient in providing data
regarding variations in organism behavior. Behavioral inventories for many species are already
available, and the organizational formats they use would make their inclusion in biodiversity
inventories relatively straightforward. Though the level of expertise for behavioral inventories is
highly variable and dependent on the organisms being inventoried, I would argue that the amount
of training necessary for this type of data collection would be roughly equivalent if not
superficially greater than that required for specimen collection. Additionally, the use of video and
sound recording technology may enable untrained staff to collect evidence of behaviors without
the need to identify them. Knowledge of behaviors carries further benefits for conservation by
allowing conservation strategies for certain organisms to be devised according to their respective
behaviors.
The addition of ecosystems to accounts of biodiversity is hardly a novel concept, but still
one worth mentioning in this review. The study of ecology provides a number of systems which
categorize specific ecosystems and allow their accurate identification, for example by observation
of organism interactions and relationships or by more obvious, physical boundaries like the edge
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of a pond. As explained in part I, the degree to which certain ecosystems are apparent as some
whole greater than the sum of the interactions of species within them has great implications for its
importance in conservation. In addition, more cohesive ecosystems exhibit “co-evolution”, in
which distinct lineages within the community interact and influence one-another’s evolutionary
trajectory through their relationships to one another. In the case of these more coherent systems,
the preservation of species’ distinct evolutionary trajectory depends also on that of one or more
other species within the community, warranting the protection of the entire community. Thus, the
assessment of ecosystems in biodiversity inventories should focus on determining the
“coherence” of the ecosystem and its value independent of the organisms within it. More obvious
and coherent systems should be recognized as independent (though certainly parallel) targets for
conservation, while systems formed by much weaker levels of interdependence need not be
strongly recognized.
Sahotra Sarkar (2005) points out that advances in computer programming such as GIS are
invaluable for questions of space delineation, and are thus a powerful tool for the quantification
of ecosystem diversity in biological systems. Such programs enable a variety of values to be
assigned to specific areas, with clear or “fuzzy” borders to indicate the strength of transition to
one state or another. As a result, these programs represent perhaps the most promising method of
measuring and describing ecosystems in biodiversity inventories.

III.4 Environmental Education and Public Exposure
Once biodiversity information has been both acquired and distributed for analysis, it is
essential that the lessons learned in biodiversity studies are shared for application elsewhere.
While government and private institutions have the most centralized and formal power to
confront conservation issues, the public sector retains the greatest potential. As with my
90

discussion of the “comprehensibility condition” in section II of this work, I continue to stress here
the importance of public participation in conservation initiatives and direct, everyday interaction
with the environment. Without the support of the public, a government is virtually helpless to
implement environmental policy. Even if enforcement, a great missing link in today’s
biodiversity legislation, is adequate, it can never be universal, and everyday decisions (like
littering or use of pesticides) cannot be constantly monitored. A good system of conservation thus
focuses not only on solid policy and enforcement but on education and dissemination of
information to keep the public informed to environmental issues and how they can help.
Gordon S. Frankie and S. Bradleigh Vinson (2004) explain that environmental education
is the solution to this problem. They define environmental education (abbreviated EE) as “the
interdisciplinary process of developing a citizenry that is knowledgeable about the total
environment—including both its natural and built aspects—and that has the capacity and the
commitment to engage in inquiry, problem solving, decision making, and action that will assure
environmental quality” (Frankie & Vinson, 2004, pp. 248). By this definition, especially where
the term “commitment” is employed, it is evident that EE includes not only an informative but an
ethical component. Though naturally environmental educators must be cautious of the idea of
indoctrination or forced education, the idea of including environmental ethics in education is a
crucial one for affecting the countless numbers of seemingly insignificant, everyday decisions
made by the public in their interactions with the environment. It is in the application of ethics to
EE that the previously established “comprehensibility condition” comes into play to a greater
extent, where more easily understood ethics are more appropriate for public education given their
greater accessibility.
Frankie and Vinson (2004) cite one particular case where this sort of education worked
particularly well. In the late 1980s, problems with forest fires in the Lomas Barbudal Biological
Reserve in the Tempisque Conservation Area of Costa Rica were exacerbating problems of exotic
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vegetation invasion and devastating local plant and animal species alike. Many local citizens used
burning techniques to destroy “pest” plants on roadsides and fields, but often accidentally
triggered wildfires, an unnatural phenomenon in local ecosystems. Residents of the local town of
Bagaces were trained in firefighting techniques in conjunction with the formation of “Los
Amigos de Lomas Barbudal”, a locally-based conservation organization. Local firefighters
worked to combat fires once they had started and educated park rangers and other local personnel
with the help of the authors and professional firefighters from the U.S. Forest Service in
California (Frankie & Vinson, 2004). Volunteers from a local high school were also enlisted, and
regular workshops were held teaching methods of fire prevention and explaining the
environmental damages caused by fires. Most importantly, in the early 1990’s the authors started
the Center for Conservation of Nature in Bagaces, which held regular meetings for discussion of
environmental issues, offered EE seminars, and sponsored a library with books about the natural
world for local children (Frankie & Vinson, 2004).
Though most of the conservation efforts initiated by Frankie and Vinson were met with
great success, others showed room for improvement. A visitor center created at the Lomas
Barbudal reserve flourished under outside financial support, but when left to its own devices it
encountered financial problems. With some minimal assistance from the University of Costa
Rica, the visitor’s center was stabilized and was able to continue its work (Frankie and Vinson,
2004). The lesson to be taken from this experience is that EE projects will often, if not always,
require outside support. Though this does not necessarily mean a great investment, it is clear that
some continued assistance is necessary.
Among other advice for EE, the authors explain that “It is important to establish and
maintain a variety of working and friendly relationships with local cooperators and leaders” to
keep local participation high and encourage eventual increased autonomy (Frankie and Vinson,
2004, pp. 251). Furthermore, outsiders seeking to establish EE programs must “know their
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audience”, and be conscious of cultural beliefs and traditions of local populations. With regard to
outside assistance, Frankie and Vinson emphasize that “there is a need for more professional
biologists to become involved in the process of transferring their biodiversity and conservation
knowledge to audiences other than their own colleagues” (Frankie and Vinson, 2004, pp. 255).
Proceeding past the practical concerns of managing EE programs, it is immediately
apparent that, aside from the informational portion, there is a prominent ethical element to
environmental education. Referring to the practical-pluralist approach to conservation ethics
outlined in part II, I would like to reiterate the utility of demand-value and intrinsic-value ethics
in environmental education. While most government policies regarding conservation reflect a
strong precautionary perspective, a knowledge of biological systems and the variety of indirect
benefits they can provide are both essential to understand such ethics and often too complex to be
conveyed outside an academic institution. In order to combat the aforementioned problems of
enforcement in sectors where educational resources and government control are limited, a strong
environmental or conservation ethic must be passed on to the populace. Changes in public school
curriculum might be a bit much to ask, but environmental education programs might certainly
want to consider placing greater emphasis on environmental ethics.
It is far more effective to provide human beings with their own conscious methods of
ethical judgment than to try to prevent environmentally destructive behaviors through law
enforcement and constant monitoring. Many religious and cultural traditions include some system
of attributing intrinsic value to the natural world; support of this cultural perspective, rather than
the introduction of potentially unconvincing or overwhelming academic ethics, would likely be a
more effective method of ethical education. One particularly appropriate example of the
relevance of local religious beliefs in conservation is that of the “ecological monks” working to
conserve forests in Thailand. Buddhist monks throughout northern Thailand have been using the
moral and practical guidelines of their religious beliefs to educate farmers and other landowners
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in ecologically sustainable land use, naturally encountering much greater success than foreign
education movements (Darlington, 1998). Thus, by enforcing the intuitive appeal of intrinsic and
short term demand-value ethics, conservationists can provide effective justification for
conservation methods without the need for substantial academic education for those who are
unwilling or unable to receive such an education.
The intuitive appeal of intrinsic and demand value ethics is likely due to their congruence
with the traditional and cultural beliefs held by many societies. While many “eastern” and Native
American religions tend to attribute intrinsic value to natural phenomena, most “western” schools
of thought tend to focus on the instrumental (demand) value of the natural world. While I have no
desire to rank one of these attitudes over the other, I will stress the appropriateness of a pluralist
conservation ethic in environmental education in this context. A monist ethic would somehow
need to reconcile the disparate cultural beliefs and traditions of a great many societies in order to
acquire consistent cooperation in conservation efforts, while a pluralist ethic could tailor
environmental education programs toward specific societies in ways which did minimally conflict
with their traditional beliefs and practices. In this way, the conservation movement might garner
greater support and achieve greater success in collaboration with the public.
It is clear that EE is an effective and powerful tool for the exchange of useful
conservation knowledge between scientists and local populations. Frankie and Vinson do not
exaggerate when they say that “EE is a necessity if [any] system of natural areas is to be
conserved and protected for the future. There is both ignorance to dispel and the need for new
information by technically competent professionals” (Frankie and Vinson, 2004, pp. 254).
Environmental education presents a strong solution to the largely human problem in biodiversity
conservation, targeting the ignorance and bias which results in ecologically harmful actions.
Nonetheless, there are other tools for the effective communication of conservation ethics,
practices, and rationale.
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Gilda Aburto (2004) makes a case for a surprisingly unexpected ally for biodiversity
conservation: the media. Citing John Muir, Rachel Carson, and the explosive growth of the
internet, Aburto lauds the communicative power and efficiency of the media in its various forms.
Adding a touch of desperation, the author explains that “Whereas yesterday pen and paper were
sufficient to battle the ax, today chainsaws and tractors have given an advantage to the
destroyers,” (Aburto, 2004, pp. 258) making it clear that the rate of biodiversity loss now far
exceeds its former limits. “Biologists alone cannot stop this destruction,” Aburto writes, “only
through communication can biologists transmit their much needed knowledge to the public,
empowering it to act” (Aburto, 2004, pp. 258). This transmission must be both fast and powerful;
the sluggish progression of scientific publication and communication between colleagues is not
nearly sufficient. But, “by means of radio or television, information can literally circle the globe
and reach millions in a very short time” (Aburto, 2004, pp. 258). In parallel with the “science of
necessity” background of conservation biology, Aburto cites the severity of the problem as the
main reason for media action. Without the sort of public exposure provided by the media,
conservation initiatives will be left without sufficient support (be it in manpower, funds, or public
opinion) to succeed.
To illustrate the importance of the media’s function, Aburto refers to the conservation of
La Mula Creek, a forest of valuable timber located between two larger protected areas in the
Guanacaste province of Costa Rica. The Costa Rican Institute of Agrarian Development (IDA)
planned to clear-cut the area and divide it among local farmers who did not own land. While the
adjacent town of Bagatzí and conservation scientists on their own had little effect in protesting
the decision, when both parties began contacting the media and speaking with local journalists,
their influence on the decision became more noticeable. Frequent correspondences with visiting
journalists from throughout the country as well as letter-writing to authorities and a few
publicized, formal studies by conservation biologists quickly turned the tide of the struggle and
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placed immense public pressure on the IDA. The institute instead donated the land to Costa
Rica’s Ministry of the Environment (MINAE), who declared it a protected region (Aburto, 2004,
pp. 259).
With this success story in mind, Aburto’s first suggestion is a partnership between
journalists and conservation researchers. Scientists, she claims, are often too “shy” with their
research and results, and are hesitant to publicize anything but fully analyzed data. In the media,
however, the more important content is often simply what is being researched and why it requires
such research. Thus, scientists should be in regular contact with media officials, providing
frequent updates to the public regarding the nature and progress of their research and raising
awareness to the conservation issues it confronts. Given the rate at which biodiversity (in its
myriad forms, including habitats, unique and non-inheritable behaviors, etc.) is being lost,
infrequent scientific publications, rarely comprehensible to the public, are insufficient to initiate
the scale and strength of effort needed to preserve biological diversity. In this way, if scientists
continue to be as conservative with their work as they have been until now, no matter how highquality the information they gather, data will be “too late” to serve their intended purpose.
Scientists are thus left in a precarious position: will they compromise their scientific reputation by
publishing what may be viewed by others as sensationalist stories about their work, or wait to
perfect their research, only to have failed the very purpose of that research in the first place?
The solution to this conundrum, says Aburto, lies in relationships with individuals who
are more prone to public exposure like politicians and journalists. As Aburto explains,
“experience has repeatedly shown that journalists can be very effective and, above all, swift when
communicating important information presented to them by biologists” (Aburto, 2004, pp. 258).
Politicians, meanwhile, thrive on media attention of any sort and are not prone to be shunned for
citing information beyond the scope of scientific data. At the same time, they boast the sort of
charisma and power needed to reach the media effectively (Aburto, 2004, pp. 259). Both of these
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parties function as “links” between scientists, public activists, the government, and the public,
keeping the flow of information constant and fresh (Aburto, 2004, pp. 259). Through the
incorporation of a journalist or political partner, data and research on conservation issues can be
“translated” effectively to a format more easily understood by the public and transferred directly
to the public knowledge base, where it can be effectively utilized by activists and governments
alike.
Aburto also provides a number of suggestions for scientists and their associates for the
publication of scientific information on conservation issues. First, stories published through these
partnerships should be “humanized” to grant them comprehensibility and appeal to a wider
audience. In order to be humanized, these stories should include not only the biological
phenomena they strive to conserve, but also the human beings involved in the efforts. This sort of
humanization is especially necessary for cases which do not involve charismatic megafauna,
which require some additional component to attract public attention. Scientific publications are
too often based solely on data and therefore less accessible to the public on a personal basis
(Aburto, 2004). These partnerships should also strive to have frequent publications to maintain
public interest and release new information as it becomes available; a steady stream of
information in smaller amounts is more “digestible” than more infrequent and larger updates
(Aburto, 2004).
It is also important to recognize that the variety of modes of communication now at any
organization’s disposal is growing on a day-to-day-basis. While television and radio remain
fantastic tools of communication, the growing powerhouse of the last twenty years is the internet.
Networking and social sites like MySpace, Facebook, and Twitter, have acquired gigantic
followings in the last decade, while with the growth of handheld computer and cell phone
technologies, human beings are more and more capable of accessing the internet. In this way, it is
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growing easier than ever for conservationists to publicize their efforts and stories to the rest of the
world; all that remains is to seize the opportunity.
Setting aside the more rarely discussed subjects of media attention and environmental
education, I will shift at last to more concrete and well-established studies of conservation
biology, particularly the management of wildlife and preserves. In their work “Threats to the
Conservation of Tropical Dry Forest in Costa Rica”, Mauricio Quesada and Kathryn E. Stoner
(2004) review the current state of conservation of an endangered ecosystem in the Tempisque and
Guanacaste conservation areas of Costa Rica and make further suggestions for how these
methods could be improved for future conservation initiatives. This case study will serve as a
solid introduction to the final portion of this section which reviews the main challenges to and
solutions for biodiversity conservation and management.

III.5 Parks and Reserves
Neotropical dry forests in Costa Rica are threatened by unintentional forest fires and
excessive logging by the cattle industry. According to one study, before 1980, the cattle industry
in particular was responsible for more deforestation than all other economic activities combined,
including commercial logging (Lehmann, 1992). As mentioned earlier, fire is often used to clear
roads, pastures, and properties of unwanted vegetation; such fires are often allowed to burn
uncontrolled and can easily become very ecologically destructive. Though the establishment of
ecological preserves served to protect a good deal of Costa Rica’s dry forests, forests outside of
protected areas were still heavily exploited. In 1988, the government made an attempt to
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encourage more responsible use of unprotected land by launching a number of economic
incentive programs to encourage reforestation, though due to insufficient enforcement and rapid
turnover in government administrations these had little effect (Quesada & Stoner, 2004). The
issue of enforcement and monitoring, as mentioned before, is a severe one, and illegal logging
and extraction, even from national parks, continues largely unchecked, especially when
conservation officers are off duty, particularly late at night or on weekends (Kishor and
Constantino 1993). Heavy logging of unprotected areas like agricultural zones or remnant forests
causes greater problems still, as some studies have indicated that isolated trees act as “stepping
stones” or biological corridors for gene flow of animal and plant life between protected areas
(Aldrich and Hamrick, 1998).
Quesada and Stoner review the conservation methods employed at two parks containing
tropical dry forest; Parque Nacional Palo Verde and Reserva Biológica Lomas Barbudal, both
located in the Guanacaste province of Costa Rica. Though cattle grazing was permitted before the
declaration of these parks as preserves, it was forbidden upon their establishment and only
reinstated in part during the late 1980’s to early 90’s. During this period, cattle-grazing was used
as a management practice to control fires (by reducing invasive plants and other fuels for
wildfires) and prevent invasion of wetlands (Mozo 1995, Quesada and Stoner, 2004). Cattle
grazing was also used at the Palo Verde reserve’s wetlands to maintain open waterbird habitat
(Vaughan et al. 1995).
Numerous studies on these reserves have shown that the cattle grazing management plan,
though it did provide some income and incentive for local support of the preserved areas, failed to
preserve diversity or control invasive organisms within the reserves. According to the authors of
the study, the wildlife management plans for both the Palo Verde and Lomas Barbudal preserves
initiated these management plans with little to no systematic research of published information
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regarding the effectiveness of cattle grazing for ecosystem management (Quesada & Stoner,
2004).
Reviewing the difficulties of this policy, Quesada and Stoner present a number of
recommendations for the management of parks and preserves which will serve as a convenient
segue into a broader review of issues and solutions in conservation management. The authors are
quick to assert that protection of intact ecosystems (in this case neotropical dry forests) is
essential, and that the practice of establishing and protecting preserves and natural parks is an
irreplaceable method of biodiversity conservation. Quesada and Stoner (2004) also suggest a
variety of methods for the protection of dry forest ecosystems from fire and invasives. The
general advice to be taken from their more specific suggestions is that funds and personnel are the
most important tool for a preserve, and are necessary for the type of integrated management
systems necessary to protect biological phenomena from a variety of often unique and situational
threats. In regard to the difficulties encountered by the Palo Verde and Lomas Barbudal
preserves, Quesada and Stoner suggest that management practices should be established on a firm
foundation of systematic research and published scientific literature (Quesada and Stoner, 2004).
The authors next stress the importance of restoration ecology, explaining that if
particularly threatened ecosystems are to be conserved, not only must those still existing be
protected, but “restoration and natural regeneration programs…need to be implemented
immediately, within both protected areas and privately owned land” (Quesada and Stoner, 2004,
pp. 277). They add that economic incentives given to private landowners should be greater for
total protection of ecosystems than simply for restoration to encourage preservation over
exploitation. To help create more scientifically sound and effective management plans, they
recommend the formation of a scientific panel for each large reserve area that is familiar with its
particular conservation issues and how to address them (Quesada and Stoner, 2004).
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In regard to ecotourism, Quesada and Stoner admit its viability as a source of economic
revenue from conservation, but emphasize that it should be regulated heavily by the government.
Recalling the gruesome “dark side” of ecotourism discussed at the beginning of this section, it is
clear that such regulation would be necessary. The authors add that a “hotel tax” or other tax on
ecotourist activities might be another powerful tool, directing profits the maintenance and
management activities of natural parks and preserves while discouraging environmentally
detrimental business practices (Quesada and Stoner, 2004).
The suggestions of Quesada and Stoner represent some of the most basic and readily
apparent solutions to conservation and management; notably that greater funds, personnel, and
training than is currently allotted to biodiversity conservation are necessary. In addition, greater
organization of these assets is required. At the same time, related efforts like restoration and
ecotourism must be both encouraged and carefully monitored for environmental impacts. These
necessities for improving conservation and management of biodiversity are repeated throughout
the literature of conservation biology like some sort of management mantra: money, people,
information, enforcement, legislation.

III.6 Adaptive Management
Beyond the sort of archetypal suggestions to improve today’s conservation measures are
a number of more specific and salient issues in conservation which--though they warrant much
more thorough attention--will be examined here only in passing as part of a larger survey of
conservation issues and solutions. The first of these concerns the very nature of conservation
management as a practice; if biodiversity conservation is largely a science of necessity and is thus
justified even in some level of uncertainty, how can management be conducted effectively with
uncertainty?
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Among other like-minded thinkers, Bryan Norton (2003) makes a case for what is often
called “adaptive management”, the concept of employing a management strategy characterized by
constant change (or adaptation) according to certain changing conditions. In the case of
biodiversity conservation, the success of biodiversity conservation “will depend more on a
willingness and ability to react to new information than on a single forever-binding choice”
(Norton, 2003, pp. 112). Because conservation biology must rely on only the most recent
information provided, it must be allowed to change with the growing and changing knowledgebase to which it is bound. As Norton explains, “chosen policies should, given the best available
science at the time of their implementation, protect both species and the ecological processes
associated with them” (Norton, 2003, pp. 111). Though the definition of biodiversity conceived in
this work is considerably broader than what Norton mentions here, his point is met with
agreement: if the conservation and management of biodiversity is to make good of its reliance on
current information, it must be flexible enough to change with shifts in understanding.
An additional component of adaptive management is the role of research. Norton
explains a multifaceted role for conservation management, claiming that practices must “protect
species [and other components of biodiversity] while continuing to explore ways to be more
sensitive to… ecosystem-level processes and characteristics” (Norton, 2003, pp. 122). Though
again Norton’s ecosystem-level definition of biodiversity is considered narrow in comparison to
the definition created in part I of this work, the clear lesson in his statement rings true.
Management must not only consist of protection and constantly changing methods of protection,
but also must strongly emphasize research, particularly in certain areas that are suspected to be
particularly important for conservation biology as a science and the management of individual
phenomena (a list of possibly important research subjects will be summarized later in this
section). Thus, adaptive management must function as a self-fueling process, constantly evolving
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based on the best information available, but also seeking out new information on germane and
important subjects.
Beyond the structure of conservation biology as a global effort and discipline lie myriad
problems for the protection of biodiversity, one of which will be covered in depth for the
remainder of the section.

III.7 The Prioritization Problem
Perhaps the most marked problem for biodiversity conservation, especially in light of
management practices, is the issue of prioritization. Naturally, sufficient resources will never be
available to preserve and protect all conceivably valuable phenomena in nature, even by the
standards of a very restricted definition and shrunken biodiversity ethic. Thus, some method of
prioritizing phenomena so that greater effort may be put toward those of greater value becomes
necessity, for fear that a unique behavior in botfly larva might be conserved at the expense of the
last patch of rainforest. As evident in the prioritization adequacy condition mentioned in section
II, this prioritization is immensely important in conservation biology and an essential “bridge”
between the theoretical and the practical. This issue is closely tied to the ethic adopted by the
conservationist, and thus is largely dependent on ethical perspective.
According to Sahotra Sarkar, the issue in biodiversity conservation is in choosing which
areas or spaces to be preserved over others. This “place prioritization problem” is “critical to
biodiversity conservation because not all places that are of some biological interest can be
conserved in practice” (Sarkar, 2005, pp. 160). Sarkar presents a number of criteria by which
areas may be ranked for conservation; all of these depend in one way or another on the property
of one or more biodiversity “surrogates”, or phenomena representative of the overall biodiversity
present in a system.
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As mentioned previously, there is a great deal of debate over the existence of biodiversity
surrogates; is it reasonable to expect that a single (or small group of) phenomena be a “litmus
test” for the biological diversity of a single system? This quandary, like the existence of a
diversity-stability connection, is a vastly important research topic for conservation biology, and
one which should be thoroughly investigated in the future.
Asserting that reasonable surrogates for biodiversity can be found, Sarkar suggests that,
aside from the abundance (or richness) of surrogates, their rarity and complementarity should be
considered. The rarity of a surrogate is the rather intuitive idea of its overall inverse abundance,
while complementarity is defined by the number of surrogates unique to that particular system
(Sarkar, 2005). Thus, areas may be prioritized by any combination of these properties, with “ties”
in properties for one particular surrogate being broken by the next rarest or most unique
surrogate, and so on. Bryan Norton takes a similar approach to prioritization, stating that
ecosystems themselves are the target of conservation, and that prioritization should also be
between physical areas, though perhaps by means of economic value for practicality (Norton,
2003).
When considering the inclusive and pluralist definition of biodiversity formed in the first
section of this text, the prioritization problem becomes all the more difficult and complex. Are
places really all that should be prioritized? Do certain areas have the ability to include most of the
biological phenomena to which value is attributed? My response is that this is not necessarily the
case. Though place prioritization is clearly the most practical solution—human beings have been
mapping out the world and drawing lines across it for millennia—it may not protect all
phenomena outlined earlier in this work. To illustrate this point, one need look no further than
most migratory seabirds, for example, the arctic tern (Sterna paradisaea), a seabird which—
though not at all endangered—travels more than 24,000 miles annually in its migration from
nesting grounds in the arctic to feeding grounds in the southern hemisphere, a journey undertaken
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largely over the ocean (Cramp, 1985). If by some unfortunate turn of events the arctic tern were
declared critically endangered, how would place prioritization measures protect it? Would
separate marine reserves at both ends of its migration be protected, or would its entire range of
migration routes (spanning nearly all of the Pacific and Atlantic oceans) be preserved? The point
is that a prescribed area on its own does not necessarily encompass all phenomena—be they
species, behaviors, or morphological forms—that it may contain at one point in time. While
territorial species or species with traditional mating and courting grounds may be restricted to
prescribed areas, it must be understood that—especially given the apparently accelerating rate of
global climate change—biological systems are dynamic and often quite mobile. The drawing of
lines for reserves alone might not preserve all that humans wish to save.
While Norton’s stand on the issue implies that ecosystems are the only “currency” of the
myriad components of biodiversity for prioritization, I am less convinced. While ecosystems are
certainly important and often do encompass much of the biodiversity of a particular region, as the
discussion of communities in section I implies, this is not always the case. Thus, while value can
and often should be attributed to ecosystems and specific areas, they are not the only phenomena
which deserve inclusion in prioritization. Sarkar’s use of surrogates for place-prioritization is a
logical and efficient approach to this problem, but I would add a slight adjustment. Not only
should places be valued for their surrogates, but these surrogates themselves, if they are
recognized to exist and represent other phenomena, must be given priority for conservation. The
difference in management which might result would be between creating a reserve in which, for
example, all of Yellowstone National Park’s wolves were protected, and protecting also the
wolves themselves. If wolves left a protected area under normal place-prioritization, they would
be subject to culling. If the wolves, too, were given priority and protected simply as they are, their
protection would not depend on their location.
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Though I propose here that various phenomena (as surrogates or individually) should be
given value during management and prioritization, I have not addressed the great question created
by my assertion: how are these phenomena to be prioritized with respect to one another? This
question necessitates a great philosophical and scientific inquiry which I could not hope to
address in this work. However, I would like to make it clear that this is another important
question for conservation biology which, if answered, would have immense benefits for the
discipline. A major focus of future research should be in seeking an effective framework for
organizing the myriad phenomena which constitute biological diversity.
In order to avoid completely shirking responsibility for my earlier assertions and
abandoning any investigation of possible prioritization methods for the various components of
biodiversity, I will propose a theoretical method of prioritization by which different phenomena
might be compared. The system is based on that used in my investigation of valuable natural
phenomena in section I, what I call the “evolutionary” approach. The idea behind this approach is
to evaluate natural phenomena with respect to the dynamic process of which they are a part, that
is, evolution. Different sources of biological variation are thus viewed as different distinct “units”
of evolution. While conventionally species have been the objective “unit” of evolution, it is
undeniable that less prominent sources of variation—such as behavior or developmental
differences—could eventually lead to divergence and evolution under the correct environmental
circumstances. Thus, components of biological diversity are ranked in importance by their
potential role in the evolutionary process.
From this perspective, it makes sense that great value is placed on species and ecosystem
diversity in existing accounts for biodiversity conservation. All existing species are doubly valued
as both the discernable products of the evolutionary process and as the predecessors of future
species. Phenomenological species provide a simple way to identify and define species, but
greater “resolution” for prioritization is needed for prioritization between species. Both of the
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methods used today—based on rarity and distinctness—are more than suitable for this purpose.
While the rarity of a species—usually determined by its total numbers or range—is fairly
intuitive, the concept of distinctness requires a closer look. Phylogeny is the primary tool for
determining the uniqueness of a given species. It is the goal in prioritization to give greater
priority to species which represent a more independent evolutionary history; one that might not
easily be repeated or replaced by another, similar species, if that species or lineage were to go
extinct. Thus, an organized account of speciation events and the relation of species to one another
is necessary to allow the prioritization of more unique lineages which are unlikely to arise again;
this sort of understanding, though difficult, is currently studied with great success using a mixture
of molecular and morphological traits (Williams et al, 1991).
Ecosystems, as established in part I, lie on a spectrum in the degree to which they carry
their own unique properties and “exist” as objective units. It follows that ecosystems which have
more emergent properties and form more coherent “wholes” deserve unique conservation in their
own right, while those which lean more in the direction of a “community of indifference” would
be better managed by the preservation of the individual species and populations from which they
are formed. Thus, prioritization with respect to ecosystems should follow from their position on
this “scale of coherence”, where more strongly apparent ecosystems with greater organism
interdependence are given higher priority for conservation than those which would be covered
simply by species conservation.
Ecosystems are considered the most valuable component of biodiversity according to the
“evolutionary” approach to prioritization for many of the same reasons that Bryan Norton gave in
his case for ecosystem conservation. Ecosystems—particularly those with strong webs of
interaction and clear emergent properties—represent perhaps the largest readily-conservable unit
of the evolutionary process. An intact ecosystem features a great number of lineages evolving
simultaneously. Characteristics like emergent properties and ecosystem services add greater
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priority to such larger phenomena, but are not necessary to provide adequate priority for
conservation. Because ecosystems reflect a broad range of biodiversity components and, as
targets for conservation, protect many phenomena in-situ, they are given the highest priority in
the “evolutionary” approach to prioritization. It must be noted, however, that this priority varies
according to the interactions within the system and the benefits and emergent properties it carries.
An ecosystem far to the “coherence” side of the spectrum would have conservation priority far
above that of just the species within it, while a “community of indifference” would have total
priority equal to that of the conservation of its parts.
Morphological disparity, particularly in “subspecies” and other types of distinct
populations not considered separate species, constitute a logical “next step” in the prioritization of
biodiversity components by an evolutionary approach. While subspecies, color-forms, and other
morphologically-distinct populations are for one reason or another not considered separate
species, they represent some genetic diversity and a strong “potential” for the formation of a
separate species. As discussed in part I, the divergence of distinct subpopulations due to changes
in selective pressures or reproductive isolation are common circumstances for the formation of
species. Thus, though by most definitions (genetic, biological, or phenomenological)
morphological differences between organisms do not carry the same priority for conservation as
separate species, the variety they represent has the potential to create new species and may thus
necessitate some lesser—though still important—priority.
Continuing down the same logical chain presented in part I, the link between other
components of biodiversity—particularly developmental and behavioral differences—and those
that are customarily given value is clear. Differences in the development of an organism due to
environmental conditions can lead to morphological differences which in turn can eventually
result in speciation. Behavioral differences may alter both environmental conditions and selective
pressures on an organism, resulting in different developmental forms. Returning to the calculus
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analogy made in part I, each rectangle outlined beneath the immeasurable curve of “biodiversity”
is given smaller and smaller priority as a theoretically complete definition of biodiversity is
approached. In this way, the prioritization of components of biodiversity can be centered upon the
conceptual framework of modern biology, the evolutionary process. By attributing value and
priority according to this progression, conservation effort can be exerted in a manner proportional
to the evolutionary importance of a given phenomenon.

III.8 Suggestions for Conservation
Over the course of this section, a great many suggestions and improvements have been
reviewed for their utility in biodiversity conservation. To conclude, I would like to summarize
these suggestions, both those which emerged from my own research and those put forth by other
authors.
Perhaps the least surprising and widespread suggestions for future conservation were
reiterated throughout the section and mentioned repeatedly by authors representing disparate
beliefs and disciplines. These ubiquitous suggestions advise the allocation of increased funds
toward conservation measures, as well as an increase in the availability of personnel and training
for management and research. Public education on a variety of conservation issues is widely held
as an effort of great importance to the conservation movement. An educated and responsible
public provides great support for conservation initiatives and would not create the sort of
problems an ignorant populace would. Where problems still occur (and may be inevitable)
enforcement is cited as a necessary measure that is often lacking. While legislation may often be
functional, if it is not properly enforced it cannot be put into practice and will not effectively
“deliver”. Lastly, it is almost unanimously accepted among conservationists that scientific
knowledge regarding these issues is incomplete. Thus, a system of adaptive management is
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necessary to ensure that management always proceeds despite uncertainty, but that in the process
it is consistently founded upon the best available research at the time of application.
Moving on to more specific suggestions, I’d like to address a few of the “lessons” that
can be taken from Costa Rica’s experience in law and policy. In regard to the overly complex
laws adopted by the country, it is evident that passing too much legislation in favor of
conservation can be just as harmful as too little, confounding management until it loses
functionality. Conservation legislation should thus be strong, simple, and clear so that it can be
correctly implemented and enforced. Costa Rica has also clearly demonstrated the potency of
environmental laws which provide economic incentives for “ecosystem services” and other
environmentally conscious decisions while discouraging ecologically harmful activities through
taxation. Such economic influence is a powerful motivator and should certainly be implemented
elsewhere.
Hanson’s discussion of biodiversity inventories presents a number of relevant suggestions
to the practice of gathering information on biodiversity, notably that developed countries should
understand that taxonomy is certainly not a dead science and that the classification and
organization of information on natural systems continues to be an important practice today. The
exchange of information between institutions in developed nations with good resources and
educated professionals and developing nations with huge stores of undocumented biodiversity
should certainly be increased, encouraging a flow of both monetary and human resources to
bolster the struggling efforts at documenting the massive amounts of biodiversity put at risk by
development. Given the additional amendments to the customary definition of biodiversity made
in this text, it follows that future inventories should include several components of biodiversity in
addition to species diversity, including behavioral, ecological, morphological, and developmental
diversity.
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Information gathered from inventorying and research should, as Aburto, Frankie, and
Vinson explain, be disseminated to the public as quickly and efficiently as possible. Scientists
working in conservation should not be “shy” and report only data through academic channels, but
should either freely communicate with journalists about their work to spread awareness or align
themselves with a political figure to garner advocacy for their efforts. Furthermore,
environmental education efforts must be integrated with local culture and social practices to
enable free exchange of information between conservationists and the local population, avoid an
attitude of indoctrination or forced education, and promote interaction characterized by mutual
respect and understanding. With regard to the pluralist ethic established in the second section of
this work, it is evident that ethical education is also a substantial part of environmental education,
and that intrinsic and demand-value ethics are the most effective for use in a non-academic
setting. Thus, both information and ethical perspective should be more freely communicated with
the public to promote a healthier attitude towards and relationship with the environment on the
part of people who will have frequent and unmonitored interactions with vulnerable natural
phenomena.
Through the work of Quesada and Stoner (not to mention many other authors), it is clear
that the protection of natural areas remains one of the most effective methods of preserving
biological variety employed today. They advise, however, that emphasis should be placed on
preserving natural systems which are still intact, rather than waiting before they are threatened to
protect them, when valuable phenomena can be harmed or lost entirely. Quesada and Stoner also
emphasize the importance of contiguity between protected and non-protected areas and the
necessity for wildlife “corridors” to enable free exchange of genetic and material resources
between the biota of protected regions. Furthermore, the authors advise that greater attention
should be paid to restoration practices in order to regain lost “ground” in global conservation
efforts and relieve the strain on protected regions which may be unique or threatened.
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The protection of biological phenomena should focus not only on specific areas, but on
the phenomena themselves (species, populations, or otherwise) which may move outside these
management areas and still deserve protection. In addition, prioritization of these myriad
phenomena is necessary to direct conservation effort and resources to appropriate targets given
the circumstances. The evolutionary prioritization model provides one possible way of organizing
phenomena, thus ranking their importance according to their role as “units” in the continued
process of evolution, with ecosystems and species at the forefront, though still attributing value to
phenomena like unique, non-genetic behaviors and morphological disparity.
Finally, a number of salient questions remain which have been targeted in this work as
ones which warrant special attention in the near future. For the establishment of a potential,
universally binding demand ethic for conservation, further research into the nature of the
diversity-stability hypothesis is essential. Furthermore, more systematic methods of conservation
prioritization (like the evolutionary model suggested here) are necessary to give greater structure
to conservation efforts. Lastly, in an effort to simplify the complex nature of conservation by
these new suggestions, it is important to investigate the possible existence of biodiversity
“surrogates”, or phenomena which can give a simple and effective reading of the biodiversity of
an area without great effort and inventorying or data collection.
Thus, in the course of this work, a great many prescriptive suggestions and “take-home
lessons” emerge that are worth consideration for the further improvement of conservation. It is
my sincere hope that these improvements and ideas (the majority of which are certainly not novel
or original to this work) are implemented in the future and can benefit the conservation of
biological variety in coming years.

Conclusion
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In the short span of this work, I have presented what I believe to be a set of practical
responses to three of the broadest and most challenging questions confronting the field of
conservation biology: specifically, the “what”, “why”, and “how” of biodiversity conservation.
Addressing each in logical order, I reviewed the thoughts of contemporary thinkers on each of
these subjects and gleaned what I viewed as the most valuable points to derive functional answers
to these difficult problems. In the concluding paragraphs I would like to both review these
responses and remind the reader of their intended purpose.
In section I, I expanded upon the traditional definitions of biodiversity (species and
ecosystems) with the addition of other sources of biological variety, notably those suggested by
MacLaurin and Sterelny (morphological and developmental) and presented my case for the
addition of unique, non-genetic behavior. I also made the assertion that ecosystems were a
valuable and unique source of biological diversity, but that their value and distinctness was
heavily dependent on the strengths of interactions of the communities within them. Drawing an
analogy from Riemann sums in calculus, I treated the definition of biodiversity as a subjective
term largely impossible to formally define, but instead presented a “closest approximation” by
means of the summation of several smaller components. In this way, I hope to present an
inclusive biodiversity definition which allows the attribution of value and the direction of
conservation effort to all sources of biological diversity. Using this inclusive definition,
policymakers will not only have a consistent and somewhat formalized account of what is meant
by the term “biodiversity,” but will also be able to provide protection for the myriad phenomena
previously excluded by policies of species protection.
The second section of this work confronted the widespread uncertainty with regard to the
value of biodiversity. Acknowledging the overwhelming consensus that indeed the many
components of biodiversity do have value and warrant conservation, I set out to create a
practically applicable ethic which could promote the effective conservation of biological variety
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in both a political and social setting. Borrowing from Sahotra Sarkar’s “Adequacy Conditions for
a Conservation Ethic”, I presented an additional adequacy condition of my own—the
comprehensibility condition—and organized these conditions into the core, practical, and
secondary categories. I then reviewed a sampling of conservation ethics presented by
contemporary thinkers and assessed their respective strengths and weaknesses in application.
Concluding that no “master conservation ethic” yet exists, I adopted a pragmatic approach and
created a practical-pluralist conservation ethic which encourages the use of a variety of ethics to
reflect the various relationships human beings have with the environment. In the presentation of
this ethic I hope to give conservationists the freedom to adopt a wider ethical perspective of
biodiversity issues and to utilize ethical systems where their strengths best apply.
Section III began with an investigation of Costa Rica’s action and legislation in favor of
biodiversity conservation, reviewing both the successes and failures of its strong commitment to
environmental sustainability. I next summarized the experiences and suggestions of several
authors on the process of biodiversity conservation, also explaining the implications of an
inclusive biodiversity definition and pluralist ethic on these practices. Lastly, I proposed the
“evolutionary prioritization method” by which the myriad components of biodiversity presented
in part I might be prioritized for conservation and management. By the end of the section, I
presented a simplified list of suggestions from both myself and other writers on ways to improve
today’s conservation methods and better protect earth’s biological diversity.
Though I am confident that the philosophical solutions proposed in this work are an
effective contribution to the theoretical and practical problems facing modern conservation
efforts, I wish to make it clear that the ideas reviewed in the preceding three sections are but a
step in the right direction. It is my hope that other conservationists can improve and build upon
my thinking or find more suitable alternatives for the same questions. Despite my assertion of
their functionality, it is clear that these practical conclusions are far from ideal. Thus, it is my
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hope that future research in addressing these difficult conservation questions focus on the pursuit
of more objective solutions, such as a clearer or more principled biodiversity concept or a
universally applicable “master ethic” for the evaluation of biological phenomena. Thus, while
management practices must adapt continually to the best available science, the principles behind
conservation, too, must continue to improve with the advances in philosophical research.
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